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problems, better understanding competition and customers recently become two emerging themes in both
theories and practices of revenue management. Meanwhile, with 20 years' successful implementation of
sophisticated revenue management systems in both airline and hotel industries, they have accumulated rich
data to better understand threats and opportunities currently facing both industries. Furthermore, with the
proliferation of online distribution channels, extensive information has been made available to both
customers and competitors. How to utilize such opportunity to understand customers and competition
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overlap more in their networks. We also find evidence that average prices increase by about $11 per one-way
segment coupon in markets where two partners are both present. After ruling out other plausible competing
mechanisms, we conclude that these findings are most likely driven by multimarket competition. The second
part of the dissertation studies travelers' strategic decision to delay purchases in anticipation of price decreases
when purchasing air-tickets. By estimating a structural model on booking and posted fare data, we find that
4.9% to 44.9% of the population are strategic, and that incorporating such strategic customer behavior will
increase revenues by 3% to 5% in certain city-pair markets. The third part of the dissertation bridges the two
themes by applying a consumer-centric lens to better understand competition in hotel industry. Using online
search and clickstream data, we propose a methodology to identify key competitors based on which hotels
customers have compared. This approach also provides a network view of localized competition structure. We
also find that there is approximately 50% mismatch between competition sets perceived by customers and
hoteliers. Independent hotels and distant hotels are usually left out of competition sets.
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ABSTRACT
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF REVENUE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES:
UNDERSTAND YOUR COMPETITION AND CUSTOMERS
Jun Li
Gerard Cachon
This dissertation empirically examines factors that challenge revenue management
practices in travel industry — air-travel and lodging. In particular, it focuses on strate-
gic interactions among firms and strategic interactions between firms and customers.
While most traditional revenue management focuses on single firm problems, better un-
derstanding competition and customers recently become two emerging themes in both
theories and practices of revenue management. Meanwhile, with 20 years’ successful
implementation of sophisticated revenue management systems in both airline and hotel
industries, they have accumulated rich data to better understand threats and oppor-
tunities currently facing both industries. Furthermore, with the proliferation of online
distribution channels, extensive information has been made available to both customers
and competitors. How to utilize such opportunity to understand customers and compe-
tition remains a question to both industry professionals and academic researchers.
This dissertation contains three parts. The first part studies implications of strate-
gic alliances in the airline industry. Airlines in the same alliance are competitors and
partners at the same time. After alliances are formed, airlines’ networks are expected to
v
be consolidated and capacity redundancies would be eliminated, as intensity of compe-
tition decreases among alliance partners. However, we find that alliance partners seek
to overlap more in their networks. We also find evidence that average prices increase by
about $11 per one-way segment coupon in markets where two partners are both present.
After ruling out other plausible competing mechanisms, we conclude that these findings
are most likely driven by multimarket competition. The second part of the dissertation
studies travelers’ strategic decision to delay purchases in anticipation of price decreases
when purchasing air-tickets. By estimating a structural model on booking and posted
fare data, we find that 4.9% to 44.9% of the population are strategic, and that incorpo-
rating such strategic customer behavior will increase revenues by 3% to 5% in certain
city-pair markets. The third part of the dissertation bridges the two themes by applying
a consumer-centric lens to better understand competition in hotel industry. Using on-
line search and clickstream data, we propose a methodology to identify key competitors
based on which hotels customers have compared. This approach also provides a network
view of localized competition structure. We also find that there is approximately 50%
mismatch between competition sets perceived by customers and hoteliers. Independent
hotels and distant hotels are usually left out of competition sets.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
This dissertation investigates factors that challenges revenue management practices in
the travel industry (air-travel and lodging industries). Particularly, it focuses on strate-
gic interactions among firms, and strategic interactions between firms and consumers.
In the past 20 years, revenue management has become an active area, but there are
relatively few empirical studies in this field and considerable gap between theories and
practices. However, those industries most sophisticated in revenue management, i.e.,
airline and hotel, also present rich opportunities for empirical research, as automated
electronic systems have been keeping good record of various types of data including
transaction, price and inventory data. Meanwhile, development of online distribution
channels recording consumer data can potentially be combined with the above mentioned
1
datasets as well.
Started from the inventory control problem for one single firm (Belobaba 1989, Gal-
lego and van Ryzin 1994), practices and studies of revenue management are moving
towards incorporating competition (Netessine and Shumsky 2005, Perakis and Sood
2006) and customer choices (Vulcano et al. 2010, Shen and Su 2007, Netessine and Tang
2009) into the big picture. This dissertation consists of three parts revolving exactly
around these two aspects: competitive environment and consumer behaviors in revenue
management practices in air-travel and lodging industries. Part 1 looks at how compe-
tition have been altered by strategic partnership in the airline industry and its long-run
revenue implications. Part 2 investigates the presence of strategic consumers and its im-
plications on revenue strategies in the air-travel industry. Part 3 bridges the two focuses
by applying a consumer-centric lens to better understand the competitive environment
in the lodging industry. I summarize hereafter the key findings from each of these three
empirical studies.
1.2 Summary of Results
1.2.1 Partnering with Competitors — An Empirical Analysis
of Airline Alliances and Multimarket Competition
Competition has become an important theme in the operations management literature
and, according to recent theoretical and empirical work, the key finding is that firms
2
tend to overstock or overproduce under competition. Following this prediction, one
would expect that, after airlines start a multifaceted collaboration by forming an alliance,
their networks would be consolidated and capacity redundancies would be eliminated, as
intensity of competition decreases among alliance partners. Surprisingly, we find exactly
the opposite: in the post-alliance era, alliance partners seek to overlap their networks
more and they increase capacities on the markets in which two partners are already
present. At the same time, average prices in those markets increase by about $11 per
one-way segment coupon. We explain these results using predictions based on the theory
of multimarket competition: as firms seek out opportunities to establish multimarket
contact to strengthen mutual forbearance, they have incentives to increase overlap even
though this decision may not seem optimal or efficient locally or in the short term.
We examine other plausible competing mechanisms built on theories of capacity and
service competition and commonly cited benefits of airline alliances but ultimately we
conclude that our findings are most likely driven by the multimarket competition. This
paper therefore underscores the importance of going beyond simple bilateral competition
models whose predictions may not hold when firms compete operationally in multiple
markets, a phenomenon which is widespread in many operations-intensive industries.
3
1.2.2 Are Consumers Strategic? Structural Estimation from
the Air-Travel Industry
Many consumers have learned to delay purchases, anticipating that prices might de-
crease. Such strategic or forward-looking behavior has attracted increasing attention
from various disciplines, including operations management, information systems, mar-
keting, and economics. However, there is currently no empirical evidence of the extent
to which this strategic decision-making actually takes place. Combining two unique
data sources from the air-travel industry (posted fares data and booking data), we use
a structural model to estimate the fraction of strategic consumers in the population,
assuming different levels of sophistication in consumers’ perception of future prices:
perfect foresight and rational expectations. We find that 4.9% to 44.9% of the popu-
lation are strategic across markets, measured by the 5th and 95th percentiles. Using
a non-parametric approach, we further find that most strategic consumers arrive either
at the beginning of the booking horizon or close to departure. Finally, our counter-
factual analysis shows that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the presence of strategic
consumers does not necessarily hurt revenues. Rather, the impact varies by market —
more likely to be negative on business markets, and positive on leisure markets. As a
result, commitment to a non-decreasing pricing strategy benefits business markets but
not leisure markets. Among markets benefiting from this pricing strategy, the median
revenue improvement is 3.5%, and the quartiles are 1.8% and 5.6%.
4
1.2.3 Who are My Competitors? Let the Customer Tell
Identifying competition set is a challenging question to many competitive industries –
hotel industry being one of them. Despite its commonly agreed importance to strategy
development and daily operations, little data-driven analytical approach has been devel-
oped to address this question. We propose in this paper a simple and intuitive method-
ology to identify true competitors from customers’ perspective using online search and
clickstream data. We build up a competition network based on customer comparison of
hotels. To illustrate the value of a customer-centric approach in competitive analysis, we
further contrast the customer-based competition network with a hotelier-based competi-
tion network developed from price matching patterns. We found that there is about 50%
mismatch between the two networks, and that hoteliers tend to ignore independent and
distant hotels while at the same time they tend to pay too much attention to branded
hotels and hotels in close proximity. This result is robust to many alternative measures
of competition. Finally, we note that the proposed methodology can easily be applied to
many other industries to aid business in identifying their key competitors and to enrich
our understanding of networked competition.
5
Chapter 2
Partnering with Competitors — An
Empirical Analysis of Airline
Alliances and Multimarket
Competition
2.1 Introduction
In March 2002, American Airlines raised the advance purchase requirement of discounted
business-travel tickets from three days to seven days, which is equivalent to an estimated
10% price increase. However, most airlines refused to follow this suit except for Conti-
nental. As a result, American rolled back the fare increase in most markets, and shot
6
back by putting $199 one-way fares in 10 markets flown by Northwest, United, Delta
and US Airways each, while excluding Continental from this revenge. In turn, North-
west fought back by offering similar fares in 20 markets flown non-stop by American,
which triggered another round of fight where American expanded its cheap fares to 20
Northwest markets, and Northwest escalated the war to 160 American markets1. This
type of price wars is not an exception but rather a rule in the airline industry. For
instance, Busse (2002) identified 31 major price wars for the 14 largest airlines during
the period of 1985-1992 using Wall Street Journal Index. A common feature of these
fare wars is that multiple markets are generally involved, as airlines fight back not only
in the local market where the price war is initiated, but also in multiple markets where
they compete with the focal rival. The consequence of this multimarket retaliation is
significant: Morrison and Winston (1996) find that a particular price war lead to a 32.4%
price decrease, on average. As a result,
[Firms that compete against each other in many markets] may hesitate to
fight vigorously because the prospects of local gain are not worth the risk of
general warfare.... A prospect of advantage from vigorous competition in
one market may be weighed against the danger of retaliatory forays by the
competitor in other markets. — Edwards (1955)
The above examples are just the tip of the iceberg. Ever since the deregulation in
1978, competition has increased dramatically in the airline industry, often manifesting
1Latest airfare battle turns into “street fight”; Fliers win as struggling airlines duke it out. USA
Today. 19 March 2002.
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itself through entries and price cuts which have significantly reduced the profitability
of this industry and led to many bankruptcies. In response, airlines initiated a wave
of alliance partnerships in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, aimed at achieving effi-
ciencies and synergies through collaboration on frequent flier programs, lounges, facility
utilization, information technology and procurement.
According to operations management theories of firms competing on operational
decisions such as inventory, capacity or production levels (e.g., Lippman and McCardle
1997), competition results in overstocking, overproduction and overbuilding of capacity.
Therefore, as cooperation among alliance partners increases, one would expect that
they would consolidate flight networks and reduce capacity redundancies in markets in
which they both operate. While competition within an alliance is tempered, competition
between alliances accelerates: Christian Klick, a Star Alliance vice president, commented
that,
Competition used to be strictly between airlines, but competition is really
happening between alliances now 2.
As a result, we would expect airlines to compete more vigorously with competitors from
different alliances through aggressive entries and capacity (over)investment.
Surprisingly, what we find in this paper is exactly the opposite: in the post-alliance
era, airlines are more likely to operate and install higher capacity in the markets where
2The Middle Seat: Shopping for Perks Among the Big Airline Alliances. Wall Street Journal.
(Eastern Edition). New York, N.Y.:Jul 8, 2010. p. D.1.
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their alliance partners are also active, and less likely to operate and install capacity in
those markets where non-allied carriers are active. This result is robust to multiple al-
ternative model specifications. We also find that airlines charge higher prices in markets
in which they operate with partners. This effect is highly economically significant: in a
typical duopoly market after an alliance, airlines are able to charge a $11 premium on a
one-way segment coupon in markets shared with partners rather than with competitors.
Both of these results are also contrary to what airlines claim would happen after the
alliance and these results also support the general concerns of policy makers: “[allied
airlines might] compete less aggressively in price or capacity in overlapping markets”3.
Although surprising, our findings are consistent with predictions of the multimarket
contact theory. In order to impose a credible threat of retaliation, airlines establish
and strengthen their multimarket contact. By strategically overlapping and increasing
capacity on routes where their partners are already present, airlines strengthen their
ties with partner airlines and solidify the partnership. On the other hand, alliances also
facilitate the process of building multimarket contact. Note that airlines are still com-
peting with their partners — an alliance is not a merger, but it is in between of a merger
and a perfectly competitive environment. While one would normally expect firms to
consolidate their activities after merging, effects of alliance on operation and capacity
decisions are more subtle. The fact that firms compete with each other in multiple mar-
kets in this industry further complicates what we would expect to see from competing
3Transportation Research Board report. Entry and Competition in the U.S. Airline Industry: Issues
and Opportunities. 1999.
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airlines with and without an alliance partnership. Our work therefore underscores the
importance of incorporating the perspective of the multimarket competition into oper-
ations management models to offer new and additional insights, and it calls for more
empirical research to understand the intricacies of multimarket competition. We also
draw attention of the regulators and industry managers to the effects of airline alliances
that damage consumers through higher prices, the actions that airlines explicitly deny
before alliances are approved by the regulators.
2.2 Literature and Hypotheses Development
Competition has become an important theme in the operations management literature
in the past two decades. Studies in this field investigated effects of competition on in-
ventory and production (Lippman and McCardle 1997), on supply chain coordination
(Cachon 2001), on the joint decisions for inventories and prices (Zhao and Atkins 2008),
on technology decisions and capacity investment (Goyal and Netessine 2007), on service
quality (Allon and Federgruen 2009), and on pricing strategies (Perakis and Sood 2006),
just to name a few. One rather general finding of this literature is that firms behave
suboptimally under competition, that is, firms tend to overstock or overproduce under
competition as compared to the centralized scenario. Lippman and McCardle (1997),
Mahajan and van Ryzin (2001), Netessine and Rudi (2003) demonstrate this result
for newsvendors who compete on inventory or production levels given exogenous retail
prices. The problem becomes more complicated when firms compete on both inventory
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and prices. Zhao and Atkins (2008) show that competition leads to higher inventory
stock level and lower retail prices. Netessine and Shumsky (2005) study airline revenue
management competition and show that more seats are protected for higher-fare pas-
sengers under competition. An empirical study by Cachon and Olivares (2009) confirms
the aforementioned predictions using automotive dealership inventory data — they find
that competition leads to higher service level or equivalently higher stocking level at
dealerships. A few recent empirical studies examine the trade-offs between prices and
service quality in service competition (Allon et al. 2011, Guajardo et al. 2011, Buell
et al. 2011). Based on these theoretical and empirical findings, we would expect to
observe capacity consolidation and network segregation among alliance partners, as the
degree of competition among partners decreases post-alliance. We therefore form our
first hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 1A: In the post-alliance era, airlines are more likely to reduce overlap
and decrease capacity in the markets in which their alliance partners possess strong
market power, as compared to markets dominated by competitors engaged in alternative
alliances.
As we noted in the introduction, one important feature of the airline industry is
that firms compete in multiple markets. Unfortunately, there is a dearth of research
in operations management on the topic of multimarket competition and the majority
of the literature that we cite models a single competitive market, or it sidesteps issues
around multimarket competition. At the same time, multimarket competition is quite
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common in practice (Greve and Baum 2001). It is the norm in multiple industries —
airlines, telephone and cable, banks and retail chains, to name a few. As we will show
shortly, incorporating the multimarket competition perspective may offer new insights
into operational strategies. As firms seek out opportunities to establish multimarket
contact to strengthen mutual forbearance, “a situation in which two firms understand
each other’s motives and strategies and implicitly coordinate to avoid competing in-
tensely” (Jayachandran et al. 1999), they have incentives to seek overlap even though
this decision may not seem optimal or efficient in the local market or in the short run.
Dating back to Edwards (1955) and Bain (1956), multimarket contact has been an
active area of research in industrial organization economics and strategy fields. Multi-
market competition is generally considered to increase mutual forbearance and temper
rivalry, and a high market concentration is necessary (if not sufficient) for tacit collusive
behaviors such as mutual forbearance. This view is largely supported by the empir-
ical evidence. Studies found that multimarket contact leads to higher prices, greater
profits and more stable competition structure, that is, lower rates of entry and exit
(see Jayachandran et al. 1999 for a review). For instance, Baum and Korn (1996) find
that multimarket contact is associated with lower entry and exit rates using data from
California-based commuter air carriers from 1979 to 1984. Gimeno and Woo (1996) find
that multimarket contact significantly increases prices. Most of the studies in this liter-
ature, however, take multimarket contact as an independent variable and focus on the
effects of multimarket contact on outcome variables such as prices, profits and market
turnovers. However, relatively little is known about the evolution of multimarket contact
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and the corresponding mechanisms through which multimarket contact is established.
In fact, the rise of multimarket contact is itself a dilemma in the sense that “[In order to
deter aggressive actions by rivals], firms must enter each other’s markets [first], which is
just the kind of action that the deterrent is supposed to limit” (Stephan et al. 2003).
Our paper recognizes alliances as a potential facilitator of this process. Alliances re-
inforce the credibility of the “friendly intension” of initial entries, which would otherwise
be seen as an aggressive action and hence induce fierce retaliation. The two main pro-
cesses through which multimarket contact enables mutual forbearance are: familiarity
and deterrence (Jayachandran et al. 1999). That is, when firms are familiar with the ca-
pabilities and strategies of their rivals, or when firms are able to prevent their rivals from
initiating aggressive actions, mutual forbearance is enhanced. Note that an alliance may
also increase familiarity and facilitate deterrence among its members. Alliance members
are commonly involved with activities such as facility and personnel sharing, joint mar-
keting programs, reciprocal frequent flier programs, and joint purchasing, etc., which
offer opportunities for alliance members to become familiar with each other’s capabil-
ities and strategies. As they enhance interactions, members have strong incentives to
restrain from aggressive behaviors, or otherwise they may be punished in a number of
ways. However, a priori we are not certain whether alliances serve as a substitute or a
complement to multimarket contact. The most closely related research that we are able
to identify is that firms with multimarket contact are more likely to collaborate on R&D
partnerships (e.g., Scott 1988). Based on the literature on multimarket competition, we
form the following competing hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 1B: In the post-alliance era, airlines are more likely to increase overlap
and capacity in the markets in which their alliance partners possess strong market power,
as compared to markets dominated by competitors engaged in alternative alliances.
As an aside, if the last hypothesis were true, this result would also reconcile with the
inverted U-shaped effect of multimarket contact on entries found in the literature (e.g.,
Baum and Korn 1999). It would also concur with (Greve 2006) in that “firms appeared
to avoid entry into markets in which the competitive reactions of the incumbents were
unpredictable”, as alliance partnership reduces this unpredictability. As suggested by
this literature, concentration is critical to sustain mutual forbearance (e.g., Busse 2002,
Jayachandran et al. 1999). Hence, in our analysis we will examine not only the presence
of an alliance partner, but also its market share measured by passenger traffic volume,
while at the same time controlling for the overall market concentration.
The two competing hypotheses offer completely opposite predictions regarding airline
operational strategies after alliances. Which one has a more compelling support is an
empirical question. By bridging the two streams of theories in operations management
and strategy, our main contribution is to provide empirical evidence on how multimarket
competition affects operational decisions. Our paper also contributes to the burgeoning
empirical literature of operations and revenue management in the airline industry, an
industry which has accumulated rich data in the past decades but received relatively little
attention from empiricists. Recent papers have examined airline flight operations such as
delays and cancelations (Li et al. 2010, Arikan and Deshpande 2010), capacity utilization
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(Ramdas and Williams 2009, Cho et al. 2007 ) and revenue management practices (Cho
et al. 2007, Vulcano et al. 2010, Newman et al. 2010). Among these topics, airline
network structure starts to capture interest of researchers. Arikan et al. (2010) develop a
stochastic model to measure the propagation effect of flights delays through the aviation
network. Network-based revenue management is gaining popularity both theoretically
(Talluri and van Ryzin 2004) and practically. Challenging problems arise as a result
of airline alliances, such as maximizing the total revenue of the combined networks of
partners and designing incentive-compatible revenue sharing schemes (Wright et al. 2010,
Hu et al. 2010, Netessine and Shumsky 2005). While most of these papers examine a
single airline network, multimarket competition has not been studied either theoretically
or empirically.
Our findings also contribute to economics literature on airline alliances (Brueckner
2003, Armantier and Richard 2008) and airline entry (Berry 1992). For instance, Gayle
(2008) find “conflicting” evidence of collusive behavior after domestic airline alliances. In
general, economic literature on airline entry largely regards decisions across markets as
independent and it has not considered implications of multimarket competition. Bajari
et al. (2007) propose a two-stage algorithm to estimate the dynamic entry game, which
is applied in Benkard et al. (2010) to simulate the long-term dynamics of the airline
merger. Our approach to describing airline entry behavior is close to their first stage
but our focus is on changes of equilibrium behavior before/after alliances and how they
are associated with the identity of allied vs. non-allied players. Estimating dynamic
games will not shed additional light on the question we aim to answer and is beyond the
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scope of this paper. In addition to entry, we also provide evidence on capacity decisions
conditional on airlines’ operating decisions.
2.3 Model
2.3.1 Entry Model
We model the segment presence, entry and exit using a Probit model. A segment is
an airport-pair or a city-pair where airlines operate direct flights, and it is the most
basic decision-making level for flight operation. An alternative approach would be to
model origin-destination (O&D) presence, either through operations of direct or connect-
ing flights. We choose segment over O&D because the presence decision at O&D level
would involve the presence of multiple segments, and thus violating the independence
assumption on observations. Although decisions at the segment level may also be corre-
lated due to connecting possibilities, this correlation can be addressed more conveniently
by controlling for positions of endpoints and of the segment in the airline networks. To
this end, consider the following problem. A carrier, indexed by i, decides whether or not
to operate a direct flight in a set of segments indexed by m, where m = 1, 2, 3, ...,M ,
and this decision is made at the beginning of every period of time (i.e., year). This
decision is based on both the level of demand and of competition. Note that demand in
a segment includes not only those passengers who travel on the O&D served directly by
this segment, but also passengers who travel on connecting itineraries partially served
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by this segment. The level of competition is affected by incumbent carriers and poten-
tial entrants — not only by the level of overall competition but also by the identity of
the competitors. Whether the incumbent is from the same or from a different alliance
presumably makes a difference. For instance, after United formed a partnership with
US Airways, United’s strategy for a particular market might be affected by whether US
Airways is currently operating in the focal market.
Specifically, consider the potential profit (which may include both immediate and
long-term gains) y∗imt from operating direct flights in segment m:
y∗imt = X
′
im(t−1)β + f
(
Dit,PartnerShareim(t−1),CompetitorShareim(t−1)
)
+ λt + αi + imt.
(2.1)
Xim(t−1) represents the lagged control4 variables for characteristics of the market and of
the network. It includes 1) segment features such as distance, population and per-capita
income of both end points, level of competition (including only direct flights), presence
of low-cost carriers (LCC), level of congestion (i.e., the load-factor); 2) network node
features (considering cities or airports as the nodes and connections between them as
edges of the network) such as degree of centrality5, competition level and LCC pres-
ence at both cities or airports; 3) network edge features such as connectivity (number
of indirect paths) and level of competition at the city-pair or airport-pair level (See
Table 2.1 for a complete description of variables included.). Dit is a {0, 1} variable
4Using more lagged years does not add much explanatory power but causes collinearity problems.
One year lag is also a common practice in related papers.
5One way to account for entries due to international connections is to include international gateways
as a control. However, this variable is highly correlated with the degree of centrality.
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indicating that carrier i is in an alliance partnership at time t if Dit = 1, 0 otherwise.
f
(
Dit,PartnerShareim(t−1),CompetitorShareim(t−1)
)
denotes the effect of an alliance, and
it will be dependent upon the partner’s market share and competitor’s market share,
which we will elaborate shortly6. λt controls for the time trend that is common to all
carriers (e.g., economic conditions). αi controls for the time-invariant carrier effects.
imt is an idiosyncratic shock which is observable to decision-makers but not to econo-
metricians. For now we assume that imt are i.i.d. across i, m and t, and we will discuss
and address the potential endogeneity concern subsequently.
Note that the underlying profit y∗imt is not observable. Instead, what we observe is a
{0, 1} variable, yimt, which indicates whether carrier i operates a direct flight on market
m at time t. The relationship of the two variables can be formalized using the following
threshold policy (Benkard et al. (2010)),
yimt = 1{y∗imt ≥ 0|yim(t−1) = 0}, (2.2)
yimt = 1{y∗imt ≥ −γimt|yim(t−1) = 1}. (2.3)
where the threshold is higher for a potential entrant (Eq. 2.2) than for the incumbent
(Eq. 2.3), that is, the potential entrant faces an entry barrier. Note that the threshold
for the entrant is normalized to zero without loss of genearality. The threshold for
the incumbents may also differ. As carriers with larger market power are usually more
6All major carriers that do not have codeshare partnership with the carrier are included as its com-
petitors. We also tried an alternative modeling approach in which we define partner’s and competitor’s
presence using {0,1} binary variable instead of using the market share but the results are consistent.
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capable of surviving lower temporary profits, we allow the threshold to be dependent on
the carrier’s own market share Sim(t−1) , i.e., γimt = γSim(t−1).
The data generating process can be summarized as follows,
y∗imt = γSim(t−1) +X
′
im(t−1)β + f(Dit; i,m, t) + λt + αi + imt, (2.4)
yimt = 1{y∗imt ≥ 0}. (2.5)
Now we take a closer look at the effect of the alliance and the identity of incumbents
(partner vs. competitor). We suspect that the presence of a partner will affect the
focal carrier’s decision differently than the presence of a competitor. However, since the
partner is not assigned randomly but chosen by airlines, one needs to be cautious about
the potential selection bias : the fact that United chooses US Airways as a partner may
reflect certain complementarities/similarities of their networks, e.g., for some reason they
tend to receive correlated demand shocks in certain markets, which are not observable
to econometricians. These possibilities make United more or less likely to operate in
the market in which US Airways is present. If this is true, we would observe such
correlation even before the alliance is formed between United and US Airways. To
address this issue it is important to control for the intrinsic correlation (not induced by
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the alliance partnership) and this is done through the difference-in-difference approach.
f
(
Dit,PartnerShareim(t−1),CompetitorShareim(t−1)
)
= δDit
+ δp1PartnerShareim(t−1) ∗ (1−Dit) + δp2PartnerShareim(t−1) ∗Dit
+ δc1CompetitorShareim(t−1) ∗ (1−Dit) + δc2CompetitorShareim(t−1) ∗Dit, (2.6)
where δ is the direct effect of an alliance, δp1 is the effect of the partner’s market share on
the entry probability pre-alliance, and δp2 describes the same effect post-alliance. Simi-
larly, δc1 and δc2 denote the effects of competitors’ market share on the entry probability
before and after an alliance7, respectively. We are interested in the changes of the effects
before and after an alliance is formed:
change of partner’s effect δp2 − δp1,
change of competitor’s effect δc2 − δc1,
difference-in-difference (δp2 − δp1)− (δc2 − δc1, )
where δp2 − δp1 represents the change in the partner’s influence on the carrier’s entry
decision after an alliance, and δc2 − δc1 represents the change in competitors’ influence.
Ultimately, we want to know whether the changes have been different (in both direc-
tion and magnitude) for partners and competitors. A significantly negative estimate of
the difference-in-difference term supports Hypothesis 1A, i.e., airlines reduce overlaps
7So far the partner/competitor effects are assumed to be the same for all carriers but we account
for carrier-specific effects in the robustness test.
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with partners after alliances, and a significantly positive estimate would support Hy-
pothesis 1B, i.e., airlines increase overlaps with partners after alliances. Note that the
identification of the difference-in-difference term comes from the fact that the change
in probabilities of operating direct flights in a segment differs in two types of markets:
those in which the partner is present vs. those in which competitors are present. The
identification is not solely due to the variation of alliance status both over time and
among carriers, although this adds further variation for identification purposes.
We summarize the model as follows:
y∗imt = γSim(t−1) +X
′
im(t−1)β + δDit + δp1PartnerShareim(t−1) + δc1CompetitorShareim(t−1)
+ (δp2 − δp1)PartnerShareim(t−1) ∗Dit + (δc2 − δc1)CompetitorShareim(t−1) ∗Dit
+ λt + αi + imt, (2.7)
yimt = 1{y∗imt ≥ 0}. (2.8)
2.3.2 Capacity Model
We further investigate how capacity decision is adjusted after an alliance, conditional
on the airline deciding to stay in the market. We want to see whether this adjustment
in capacity differs for markets operated together with partners vs. competitors. We use
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a model that is similar to the entry model above but with appropriate changes:
Kimt = γSim(t−1) +X ′im(t−1)β + δDit
+ δp1PartnerShareim(t−1) + δc1CompetitorShareim(t−1)
+ (δp2 − δp1)PartnerShareim(t−1) ∗Dit + (δc2 − δc1)CompetitorShareim(t−1) ∗Dit
+ λt + αi + imt, (2.9)
imt = µim + ξimt, (2.10)
where Kimt is the capacity measured as the logarithm of the carrier’s number of seats
supplied in the segment annually. The rest of the variables are as previously defined.
Specifications of the error terms will be discussed in the endogeneity section that follows.
2.3.3 Endogeneity
Correlated Random Effects Model. Even though we use lagged market share among
the explanatory variables and we control for as many relevant covariates as possible,
lagged market share may still be correlated with the unobserved profitability. For in-
stance, if profitability shocks are correlated over time, some markets may be more or less
profitable for some specific carriers, or if demand and supply shocks are autocorrelated
over time, lagged market share will still be correlated with the current profitability shock.
In linear panel data models (such as the capacity model), this type of endogeneity is
commonly addressed by allowing for correlation between the fixed effects and other co-
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variates, by allowing for serial correlation in shocks, and by using lagged first-difference
of independent variable as instruments. However, addressing this endogeneity is more
complicated in nonlinear panel data models (such as the Probit entry model we present
here). Chamberlain (1980) – Mundlak (1978) developed a Correlated Random Effects
Probit Model to address endogeneity problems in dynamic nonlinear panel data models.
Following this classical approach, we decompose the error term into two parts: an
unobserved carrier-market specific term and an idiosyncratic shock imt = cim + εimt,
where cim can be regarded as the unobserved component of the carrier-market specific
profitability shock. Traditional random effects model would require strict exogeneity
E(cim|Wimt) = 0, where Wimt represents all the explanatory variables. However, this
assumption might be violated as airlines, based on their experiences in the market, may
have some knowledge about the market profitability specific to itself, and furthermore,
this shock may be correlated with its partner’s or competitor’s profitability in the same
market and hence correlated with even the lagged market shares. That is, cim can
be correlated with the market share of the focal airline, its partners and competitors,
biasing our estimation of the effects of partner’s market share and competitor’s market
share. To allow for correlation between the carrier-market specific profitability shocks,
the essential idea is to explicitly model the correlation between cim and Wimt in a specific
way (see Wooldridge (2010)),
cim ∼ Normal(ψ +W imξ, σ2c ), (2.11)
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where W im is the average of Wimt over time. It turns out that this estimation can be
done within the traditional random effects framework by adding W im to the original
estimation. By allowing this carrier-market specific effect, we account for the subject-
specific heterogeneity (which can be endogenous).
Another way to allow for this correlation over time is to specify serial correlation
through AR(1) process. Such models have been developed under the Generalized Esti-
mating Equation framework (see Wooldridge (2010)). We will also present estimation
results under this specification.
Similar endogeneity concerns arise in the capacity model as well but in the linear
panel data model this endogeneity can be addressed more easily. To do so, one would
want to use random effects and fixed effects models. One complication is that, once
we include the lagged independent variable among explanatory variables, for example,
we may want to include lagged capacity level in right-hand side of the capacity model,
but the traditional fixed effects model will still produce biased estimates. The most
recent approach to get around this issue is a GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and
Bond (1991). We will also show the estimation result using the Arellano-Bond estimator
to account for potential correlation between the error term and explanatory variables
Kim(t−1), Xim(t−1).
Endogeneity Concerns regarding the Identification of the Difference-in-
Difference Effect. The classical difference-in-difference identification strategy is based
on a few implicit assumptions: 1) Without the alliance treatment, the effects of the
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partner’s and competitors’ share on the entry probability would have followed the same
trend over time. To check robustness of the results, we allow for different trends by
adding separate yearly shocks to the partner’s effect (δp1) and the competitor’s effect
(δc1), which is the equivalent of adding interaction terms between yearly dummies and
the partner/competitor market share. 2) Effects of partner’s/competitors’ market share
are the same for all airlines. To check robustness, we allow for carrier-specific “atti-
tudes” towards partners and competitors by including interaction terms between carrier
dummies and partner/competitor market share. 3) Without the alliance, the change of
partner’s/competitors’ effects would have followed the same trend for every carrier for
both treated (allied) and untreated (non-allied) airlines. We relax this assumption by
including a carrier-specific linear trend in the effects of partner’s/competitor’s market
shares (similar to Besley and Burgess (2004)) which allow carriers to follow different
trends in a limited but revealing manner.
2.4 Data
The principal data sources for our study are the Bureau of Transportation Statistics’ T-
100 Domestic Segment Data and Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) which
we supplement with population and income data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
The T-100 Domestic Segment Data provides quarterly information on seat capacity,
number of enplaned passengers and the load-factor. The DB1B data is a 10% quarterly
sample of all airline tickets in the United States, which includes price information. These
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are standard data sources for the closely related studies.
To accurately measure the impact of the treatment we need a proper time window.
The span of our study runs from 1998 through 2006, which is equivalent to 8 years of data
as we use lagged control variables. We choose this particular time period to balance the
‘before’ and after’ periods around the major alliance events that took place in 2003.8.
We do not use years far ahead because airlines’ strategy might have changed over a
long time-frame due to policy/technology/management/economy changes. Moreover, we
estimated the decay of the effect using longer horizons, and found that one to two years
after the alliance is the period in which most route adjustments are made9. Although
quarterly data is available in our databases, we use yearly data because this is a more
appropriate time-frame in the airline industry to make entry and exit decisions and yearly
aggregation corrects for the seasonal effects. The carriers of interest are major domestic
airlines including AA (American), UA (United), US (US Airways), CO (Continental),
DL (Delta) and NW (Northwest). Since we use yearly data, a carrier is defined as
present in a market if it operates a direct flight on the market throughout the year. We
consider CO and NW in partnership starting from 1999 (officially approved in November
8We adjust for other major changes in the airline industry during the period of study. 1)September
11 Effects. We use year dummies to account for industry-wide effect and 9·11-UA/AA dummies. We
also replace markets that experience temporary exit in 2002 and re-entry in 2003 as being active in
2002. 2)Acquisition and merger. American Airlines acquired Trans World Airlines in 2001. The
routes taken over from Trans World are not counted as entries. Two national airlines, US Airways
and America West, merged in 2005. However, America West continued reporting under its code until
2007. 3)Bankruptcy. All major airlines experienced financial difficulties from 2002 to 2004. Four filed
for bankruptcy protection while continuing their operations. Although we could control for financial
performances in the model, it does not affect the results as the financial shocks are generic to the airline
overall, but they are not market-specific – there is no particular reason why markets operated with
partners or competitors should be affected more.
9We also tried to extend the study to longer horizons and the results remained qualitatively
unchanged.
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1998), UA and US in partnership starting from 2003, and DL and CO, DL and NW in
partnership starting from 200410.
We also made the effort to replace regional airlines by their parental major airlines.
This modification is necessary because during the past decades major airlines gradually
gave up direct presence in many smaller markets and instead contracted with regional
partners to operate on these routes. This does not mean that the major airlines have
ceased operations in these markets; they simply started operating in a more efficient
way by utilizing smaller aircrafts in smaller markets. Moreover, consumers still buy
tickets to these destinations under the brand name of the major airlines and the major
airlines control pricing and revenue management systems of the smaller carriers. Without
accounting for these shifts, we would have counted many more exits. Regional airlines
accounted for no less than 20% of all the tickets sold. Details of this correction procedure
are found in Appendix Table 5.1. Note that the same regional airline may have operated
for different major carriers at different times of its history, e.g., Air Wisconsin started the
transition from serving United Airlines to US Airways in 2003 when United Airlines filed
for bankruptcy. Also note that the same regional airline may contract with two or more
major airlines at the same time and even on the same markets. We use DB1B data to
help us correctly identify these markets as well as the percentage of capacity contracted
for each major airline. For example, if both major airlines A and B sell tickets on the
same flight operated by the regional airline X, there can be two possibilities. One is that
X only contracts with airline A, but airline B can also sell tickets on flights operated
10Officially approved in June 2003. The results are not sensitive to this specification
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by X through codesharing agreements with A. The other possibility is that X contracts
with both A and B. To distinguish these two cases, we look at the percentage of tickets
sold on A and B. In the former case, A sells the majority of the tickets. In the latter
case, A and B sell comparable portions. Practically, we use 80% as the dividing point.
The results are not sensitive to this specification.
Following standard strategies used with this data (e.g., Benkard et al. 2010), we
select the 75 largest U.S. airports, where size is defined by the enplaned passenger
traffic. We then map the 75 airports to Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs). We
use Composite Statistical Area (CSA) or Metropolitan Division when necessary. For
example, airports serving the New York area, JFK, LGA, EWR and ISP are grouped
to New York-Newark-Bridgeport CSA. This grouping accounts for spatial correlation
among these airports since airports close to each other usually have correlated demand
and supply shocks. This grouping gives us 62 MSAs (see Appendix Table 5.2 for details).
We supplement the airline data with annual population estimates and per-capita incomes
for these MSAs from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
We construct the set of markets containing all possible directional combinations11 of
these 62 MSAs, which gives us 3, 782 markets. Thus, we have a panel data of 22, 696
market-carrier dyads for 8 years. To account for occasional redirection of flights due
to unforseen events such as severe weather, we only count an airline as operating the
market in a particular year if it carried more than 36000 passengers in that market-year
11Results are similar when using non-directional market definitions.
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(as in Benkard et al. (2010)), which roughly corresponds to one flight per day12. To focus
on the most common types of trips, we place the following restrictions on the raw data
to obtain average market fares, following Ito and Lee (2007) : 1) we restrict our analysis
to round-trip, coach class tickets; 2) we limit our analysis to tickets with no more than
two coupons per directional leg; 3) we exclude itineraries with fares per person less than
$25 or greater than $1,500 since they might represent employee tickets or frequent flyer
miles tickets or data errors; 4) we exclude itineraries on which the marketing carrier of
either segment was a non-U.S. carrier. All of these are standard data transformations
which are commonly used in the literature utilizing the same data sources.
Table 2.1 describes the key variables and Table 2.2 presents the summary statistics
and the correlation information. The left-hand side variables include the operating sta-
tus, capacity, average fare, traffic and the load-factor of each carrier on each market-year.
The variables of interest include market shares (for the partner and for the competitor),
the alliance status, and the interaction terms between these two sets of variables. The
covariates included in this study fall into the following three categories: market charac-
teristics, network nodal features, and network edge features. As in most other airline
industry studies, we include market control characteristics such as distance, demograph-
ics at both endpoints, the level of competition and the low-cost carrier’s market share.
In addition, we believe that a key operational measure, i.e., the load-factor, is a critical
indication in the airline entry decision and the price level, since the load-factor reflects
12We also tried different cut-off values such as 3600 as used in Berry (1992) and Borenstein and Rose.
(1994), which corresponds to one regional jet per week. Our results are not sensitive to this cut-off
value.
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the congestion level of the market, carriers’ operating costs, and their ability to man-
age demand uncertainty. Inspired by the network perspective adopted in the alliance
formation literature, we add flight network features into this study13. The second cate-
gory, i.e., network nodal features, include carriers’ origin and destination degree, market
share, level of competition and presence of low-cost carriers. Airlines’ decisions to offer
direct services on a market also depend on all the connecting possibilities through trans-
ferring at the origin and destination airports. In a hub-and-spoke network, origin and
destination degree of centrality capture these possibilities, and this metric defines to a
great extent the position of a route in the airline’s entire network14. We choose degree
centrality measures over hub-or-spoke measures since the former describe network posi-
tions more accurately, allowing for the emergence of subhubs during the time of study.
The third category of covariates includes network edge measures, i.e., the number of
one-stop connecting routes between the origin and the destination since airlines’ entry
decisions are also dependent on the alternative existing connecting services. Finally,
we include measures of competition and low-cost carrier presence when accounting for
these connecting possibilities. These network features have not been traditionally in-
cluded in the related literature, though recently Benkard et al. (2010) started to adopt
similar measures. We believe that inclusion of these measures is critical in recognizing
that flight operation and capacity decisions are deeply embedded in the structure of the
13Flight networks are different from the relational networks in the management literature. Nodes are
represented by airports in the former and by airlines in the latter.
14We also tried to include other types of network centrality measures, such as closeness centrality and
betweenness centrality. However, these more sophisticated centrality measures did not add much value
on top of degree centrality. We believe the reason is that in a hub-spoke network, degree centrality
already contains most information.
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entire network. We note that our summary statistics are consistent with those in related
studies of the airline industry.
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2.5 Results
2.5.1 Estimation Results of the Entry Model
We begin our analysis by providing key summary statistics for exploratory purposes and
in order to allow for initial understanding of the competitive landscape in the industry.
Table 2.3 shows the entry and exit dynamics of the major airlines in the study period.
We notice that, over the 8-year period, on average there has been approximately 10%
turnover (entry/exit) each year. However, there was some turmoil in turnover right
after the alliances were formed by most major airlines. United, US Air, Delta and
Northwest all saw a sizable increase in the number of entries after the alliances in 2003
and 2004. One may suspect that this turmoil is caused by the events of September 11
and the financial crisis followed right after. If this is the driving force, the entire flight
network should be affected and there seems to be no particular reason why markets
previously operated together with certain airlines should be affected more or less than
markets operated with others. To examine this issue, it is helpful to look into changes of
overlap patterns with partners (or partners-to-be) vs. changes of overlap patterns with
competitors over the same period of time. We provide relevant summary statistics in
Table 2.4. Two airlines are considered to overlap in a segment if they both operate direct
flights in it. United and US Airways have seen a notable increase in both the absolute
number and the percentage of overlapping segments after their alliance, a change from
5.5% to 11.1%. Although the changes for Skyteam (Delta, Northwest and Continental)
seem to be less obvious, a fair comparison is to contrast this with overlapping trends
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Table 2.3: Airline Route Statistics 1999-2006
UA US AA
stay entry exit turnover stay entry exit turnover stay entry exit turnover
1999 282 3 4 0.024 338 18 9 0.078 255 26 2 0.109
2000 281 9 4 0.046 338 13 18 0.087 275 46 6 0.185
2001 278 5 12 0.059 331 1 20 0.060 297 11 24 0.109
2002 259 2 24 0.092 258 2 74 0.229 289 98† 19 0.380
2003 243 9 14 0.089 228 2 32 0.131 370 17 16 0.085
2004 246 25 6 0.123 221 25 9 0.148 334 19 53 0.186
2005 257 31 14 0.166 221 29 25 0.220 344 16 9 0.071
2006 264 10 24 0.118 241 17 9 0.104 346 7 14 0.058
DL CO NW
stay entry exit turnover stay entry exit turnover stay entry exit turnover
1999 388 12 12 0.060 209 11 5 0.075 234 8 2 0.042
2000 391 21 9 0.075 219 7 1 0.036 240 5 2 0.029
2001 380 5 32 0.090 226 11 0 0.049 244 4 1 0.020
2002 363 15 22 0.096 231 3 6 0.038 247 3 1 0.016
2003 344 6 32 0.101 229 2 5 0.030 239 3 11 0.056
2004 334 30 16 0.131 231 9 0 0.039 239 10 3 0.054
2005 316 33 48 0.223 237 6 3 0.038 241 13 8 0.084
2006 319 12 30 0.120 243 8 0 0.033 218 3 36 0.154
†: AA acquired Trans-World Airlines in 2001.
among competitors from different airlines. As we show in the third column of Table 2.4,
cross-alliance overlapping significantly decreased in both absolute and relative terms, a
change from 22.1% to 19.0%, which makes the change in overlaps between same-alliance
carriers more prominent.
Although this preliminary evidence is already indicative, we now move to rigorous
statistical analysis. The three columns in Table 2.5 represent results from Probit models
using an increasing number of control variables: Model 1 has only demographic and
segment-level controls, Model 2 adds some network features, and Model 3 has a full
set of network controls to demonstrate robustness of our results. Standard collinearity
tests indicate no multicollinearity problems, and the models are estimated with a good
model fit, at R2 around 0.88 (largely due to high persistency over time). The estimates
of the control variables are consistent with existing literature both in magnitudes and
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Table 2.4: U.S. Domestic Airlines Flight Network and Overlap 1998-2006
UA & US DL,NW & CO
overlapped total overlapped overlapped total overlapped
# routes # routes % # routes # routes %
1998 33 600 5.50% 70 780 8.97%
1999 39 602 6.48% 64 798 8.02%
2000 38 603 6.30% 67 816 8.21%
2001 33 582 5.67% 60 810 7.41%
2002 22 495 4.44% 60 800 7.50%
2003 24 458 5.24% 55 768 7.16%
2004 33 484 6.82% 64 789 8.11%
2005 44 495 8.89% 64 782 8.18%
2006 53 479 11.06% 62 741 8.37%
Airlines from different alliance
1998 291 1318 22.08%
1999 304 1331 22.84%
2000 334 1352 24.70%
2001 323 1324 24.40%
2002 282 1358 20.77%
2003 266 1314 20.24%
2004 285 1309 21.77%
2005 263 1340 19.63%
2006 245 1293 18.95%
signs. Congestion level (both the overall load-factor and the focal carrier’s own load-
factor) is positively associated with more entries. The degree of competition, both at
the segment and the nodal levels, are positively associated with entries, which can be
explained by higher underlying profitability of the market. Competition from low-cost
carriers, both at segment and nodal levels, poses a credible threat and leads to fewer
entries. The network controls are mostly significant and contribute to the explanatory
power. A high degree of centrality is associated with a higher probability of operating,
which also reflects the fact that airline’s market power at the endpoints is strongly
associated with active entries (e.g.,Berry 1992). Note that the degree of competition
on O&D level is negatively correlated with entry, while competition at segment level is
positively correlated with entry.
We now move on to discuss the variables of main interest, including the change of the
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Table 2.5: Probit Model of Entry/Stay/Exit 1998-2006
(1) (2) (3)
Parameters of Interest alliance 0.412*** 0.871*** 0.763***
(0.053) (0.079) (0.081)
own share 1.291*** 0.446*** 0.460***
(0.072) (0.060) (0.061)
partner share before alliance (δp1) -0.690*** -0.945*** -1.095***
(0.090) (0.113) (0.114)
competitor share before alliance (δc1) -0.204*** -0.267*** -0.409***
(0.051) (0.060) (0.062)
partner share after alliance (δp2) -0.474*** -0.531*** -0.668***
(0.077) (0.100) (0.103)
competitor share after alliance (δc2) -0.797*** -0.645*** -0.793***
(0.060) (0.074) (0.076)
change in partner effect (δp2 − δp1) 0.216*** 0.414*** 0.427***
(0.111) (0.141) (0.141)
change in competitor effect (δc2 − δc1) -0.593*** -0.378*** -0.384***
(0.070) (0.082) (0.082)
difference-in-difference 0.809*** 0.793*** 0.811***
(δp2 − δp1)-(δc2 − δc1) (0.127) (0.156) (0.156)
Segment Features log(distance) -0.241*** -0.199*** -0.228***
(0.015) (0.018) (0.021)
log sqrt(pop1 * pop2) 0.303*** -0.089*** -0.083***
(0.023) (0.028) (0.028)
log(income) 0.652*** 0.389*** 0.246
(0.156) (0.181) (0.184)
loadfactor 0.779*** 0.970*** 0.985***
(0.067) (0.086) (0.089)
HHI -1.056*** -1.154*** -1.330***
(0.060) (0.073) (0.078)
lcc -0.839*** -0.273*** -0.314***
(0.060) (0.077) (0.117)
own loadfactor 4.601*** 3.902*** 3.898***
(0.068) (0.074) (0.075)
Node Features origin HHI 0.757*** 0.822***
(0.086) (0.090)
dest HHI 0.770*** 0.912***
(0.087) (0.090)
origin lcc -0.410*** -0.211
(0.117) (0.122)
dest lcc -0.385*** -0.256
(0.116) (0.119)
own origin degree 0.029*** 0.030***
(0.001) (0.001)
own dest degree 0.029*** 0.030***
(0.001) (0.001)
own origin share 0.240** 0.152*
(0.079) (0.082)
own dest share 0.227** 0.092
(0.080) (0.083)
Edge Features # indirect paths 0.060***
(0.012)
O&D HHI 0.568***
(0.074)
O&D lcc -0.224
(0.130)
year dummy yes yes yes
carrier dummy yes yes yes
# obs 181536 181536 181536
Pseudo R-Square 0.8703 0.8917 0.8927
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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partner effect, the change of the competitor effect and the difference-in-difference term.
We focus on explaining the results from Model 3. In support of Hypothesis 1B, the
change of partner effect is significantly positive (0.427), the change of competitor effect
is significantly negative (-0.384), and the difference-in-difference term is positive and
significant (0.811). The results are consistent after we control for potential endogeneity
between lagged market share and profitability shock, as shown in Table 2.6. The changes
of partner and competitor effects have been slightly biased up, the difference-in-difference
estimate is almost the same (0.907 under correlated random effect model, and 0.784
under serial correlation model). This estimated difference-in-difference term is also at a
similar scale when we relax different assumptions underlying the difference-in-difference
identification15. These results demonstrate consistently that, post alliance, airlines are
more likely to operate in a market in which their partners have a strong presence. In
addition, we conduct placebo analysis using randomly chosen years, and there are no
significant changes of entry strategy in those years other than years when the alliances
were formed, which suggests that there appears to be no “fundamentally different”
changes in the markets operated by partners due to reasons other than alliances.
Economic Significance. We next compute the marginal effects to understand the
economic significance of these estimates. Recall that in the Probit model marginal effects
15Note that, after including interaction terms of the yearly dummy and the partner’s/competitors’
share, the identification of the change in partner’s effect (δp1 − δp2) comes from the differences in the
timing of alliance formation. The identification of the change in the competitor’s effect (δc2 − δc1)
comes from both the timing differences and the fact that AA never started a partnership with other
major domestic airlines. As variation in timing is low (UA, US in 2003, and DL in 2004), it is not
surprising that the change in partner’s effect is absorbed by year-specific partner effect. However, the
key conclusion stands as the difference-in-difference term is still significant and at the same scale.
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Table 2.6: Results for the Entry Model with Corrections for Endogeneity
Traditional RE Correlated RE GEE GEE-AR(1)
change in partner effect 0.233*** 0.343*** 0.328*** 0.275***
(0.117) (0.130) (0.114) (0.113)
change in competitor effect -0.614*** -0.564*** -0.450*** -0.509***
(0.073) (0.081) (0.074) (0.074)
difference-in-difference 0.848*** 0.907*** 0.778*** 0.784***
(0.089) (0.097) (0.087) (0.084)
# obs 181536 181536 181536 181536
GEE: Generalized Estimating Equation.
depend on the predicted probability of market presence at the point under considera-
tion. We follow Anderson and Newell (2003) to calculate the marginal effects. Figures
4.3 and 4.4 illustrate the marginal effects at different market share levels of the operating
carrier, of the partner and of competitors. The X, Y and Z-axes in both figures are the
partner’s share, competitor’s share and the marginal effect on the probability of operat-
ing. Figure 4.3 demonstrates the marginal effect on entry probability (i.e., conditional
on not operating previously). The change in partner’s marginal effects and competitors’
effects are depicted in red and blue, respectively. We show both the average and the
95% confidence interval of these effects. The clear gap between the two confidence inter-
vals shows that the marginal effects of the “difference-in-difference” term is significant
and positive. We make a conservative interpretation of this graph based on the point
with the narrowest gap. A 1% increase in the partner’s market share would induce an
additional 0.005% in the entry probability, while the same change in competitor’s mar-
ket share would lead to a 0.007% decrease in entry probability. This change may look
small at the absolute level, but it actually corresponds to 2% increase from the baseline
entry probability (at 0.005 as inferred from the data). To make this more tangible, we
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compare two typical types of markets (i.e., average markets from the data) conditional
on that the focal carrier does not operate in the market: one dominated by a partner
(80% market share), the other by a competitor (80% market share). In the first market,
the carrier’s entry probability increases from 0.0057 to 0.0098 after the alliance, or it is
almost doubledWe estimate that, on average, alliances are responsible for 4 more entries
into partner-dominated markets and 18 fewer entries into competitor-dominated markets
annually. The difference-in-difference is 22 entries per year, which is highly economically
significant (20% of the baseline annual entries).
Figure 2.1: Marginal Effect and 95% Con-
fidence Interval
Figure 2.2: Marginal Effect at Different
Levels of Market Share
In what types of markets based on the competition structure are we more likely to
observe partner-favoring behaviors? We analyze this question based on four levels of
market share by the operating carrier: 0%, 30%, 50% and 80%, which correspond to
typical levels of market shares in the following four scenarios: when the focal airline is
a potential entrant, or is an incumbent in oligopoly, duopoly, and monopoly settings,
respectively. The marginal effects of these difference-in-difference terms are all positive
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and significant as shown in Figure 4.4. Note that the largest parter-favoring effect is
observed in the oligopoly case (30%), where the airline is likely to compete with one
partner and one competitor. In this scenario, the tension between competitors from
different leagues makes it more valuable to gain additional market power. The effect is
the smallest in the monopoly case (80%), in which the operating airline is most likely
to operate in such a market regardless of the market power possessed by the partner.
The effect for non-existing operating carriers (0%) and the duopoly case (50%) fall in
between, as expected.
2.5.2 Estimation Results of the Capacity Model
We continue the discussion of our findings for the capacity model with result shown
in Table 2.7. The model is estimated under Pooled OLS, Random Effects and Fixed
Effects and under dynamic panel data model with Arellano-Bond estimator. Again, in
support of Hypothesis 1B, the results are consistent with our earlier results for the market
entry: airlines increase capacity in the markets where they compete with their partners,
while decreasing capacity in those markets where they compete with competitors. That
is, instead of reducing capacity redundancy, airlines actually expand capacity in those
markets where their partners are also present. We focus on the Fixed Effects Model and
Arellano-Bond estimators as they properly address the endogeneity issues. To assess
the economic impact of these estimates, we compare two typical duopoly markets: one
operated by the carrier of interest and its partner, the other by the same carrier and one
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Table 2.7: Regression of Capacity conditional on Stay 1998-2006
Without Lagged Capacity With Lagged Capacity
Pooled OLS Random Effect Fixed Effect Arellano-Bond
change in partner effect 0.116* 0.153*** 0.193*** 0.175***
(0.062) (0.034) (0.032) (0.054)
change in competitor effect 0.055 -0.160** -0.148*** -0.140***
(0.037) (0.021) (0.021) (0.029)
difference-in-difference 0.061 0.313*** 0.341*** 0.315***
(0.071) (0.039) (0.038) (0.060)
# observation 13351 13351 13351 13351
adj. R-square 0.576 -
within 0.212 0.244
between 0.454 0.192
overall 0.454 0.215
of its competitors. Each carrier possesses 45% of the market share, and operates 250,000
seats annually (inferred empirically from the data). Note that, in these scenarios, the
only difference is the “identity” of the other player (i.e., a partner or a competitor). In
the market operated with a partner, after the alliance, each airline increases seat capacity
by 8.69%, which corresponds to 21,700 more seats annually (418 seats weekly) – roughly
3 additional flights per week. However, if the market is operated with a competitor, each
airline would reduce its annual seat capacity by 6.65%, or 16,625 fewer seats annually
(319 fewer seats weekly) – 2 less flight per week. If we look at the difference-in-difference
estimate, the capacity change in the partner’s market over the competitor’s market is
15%, or 5 flights per week. These capacity changes are clearly economically significant
in addition to being statistically significant.
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2.6 Examination of Competing Explanatory Mech-
anisms
Although so far we find compelling reasons to support Hypothesis 1B and the multimar-
ket contact explanation behind it, there are also alternative explanations which might (at
least partially) explain what we have observed. These explanations are mainly formed
around two commonly cited benefits of alliances: one is cost reduction, and the other is
customer acquisition. We examine the most plausible arguments of each.
2.6.1 Supply Side: Cost Reduction
It is commonly argued that airline alliances help their members take advantage of cost
synergies through cost reduction activities such as facility and personnel sharing, joint
marketing programs, and joint procurement. The cost reduction may come in two forms:
entry cost reduction and operating costs reduction. Entry costs mainly include expenses
associated with acquiring gate slots and purchasing additional aircrafts, if needed. At
congested airports, operating barriers such as slot controls for takeoffs and landings and
long-term exclusive-use gate leases make it difficult for most airlines to enter: enter-
ing airlines sometimes have to sublease gates from the big incumbent airlines (General
Accounting Office 1998). In this scenario, entry barriers are lowered for partners who
engage in gate sharing. As far as operating costs are concerned, fuel and labor costs are
the two biggest components. Fuel costs rose from 15% to 36% of the total revenue since
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2003, while labor costs are 25% of the total revenue over past 6 years (S&P Industry Re-
port). Joint fuel procurement and hedging, personnel sharing and additional bargaining
power with labor unions should help alliance members reduce operating costs. Based
on the argument of cost reduction through alliances, two alternative explanations may
arise,
Alternative Explanation 1: Airline alliances lead to reduced entry costs, and
hence they result in higher entry rates into markets in which the alliance partners operate.
Though this argument may be plausible to explain the observed increase in entry
rates, it offers no insight into the reasons for capacity expansion: conditional on being
an incumbent, an airline’s capacity decision is not so much dependent on the changes of
entry costs. Thus, we do not think this explanation provides adequate support to our
findings.
Alternative Explanation 2: Airline alliances lead to reduced operating costs,
which in turn lead to higher rates of entry and higher level of capacity in markets in
which the alliance partners operate.
If this argument were true, we would see consistent changes in both entry and capacity
decisions as we have documented in this paper. However, if this argument were true,
lower operating costs would also lead to lower average prices in the long run. In an
industry as competitive as this, firms compete mainly on prices and frequent price wars
are manifestations of this fact. The price competition is further escalated by constant
invasions from low-cost carriers. Recently, the price competition has led airlines to
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“innovate” in new ways to cut base prices — such as charging for food and baggage.
As a result, we note that in this industry any reduction in costs is most likely to be
reflected in final prices. This point has also been emphasized by alliance officials: “we
are committed to pass on these cost benefits to consumers”. Therefore, we would expect
to observe lower prices as a result of lower operating costs. To examine this possibility,
we analyze changes of prices in markets operated with partners vs. markets operated
with competitors before and after alliances, using a similar framework to what we used
for the entry and capacity decisions. We conduct the analysis using pooled OLS, random
effects and fixed effects models, and obtain consistent results. We show results based
on the fixed effects model which addresses potential endogeneity concerns in Table 2.8
Column 1. Contrary to what this explanation suggests, after formation of alliances,
airlines actually charge $4.2 more on average in segments operated together with their
partners, compared to $7.3 less in segments operated with competitors (we obtain these
numbers using the previous duopoly market example). That is, an $11.5 premium is
charged for an average one-way segment coupon in markets operated with partners.
Segment prices are taken as the distance-weighted average of itinerary prices (Dana
and Orlov 2009), to keep the analysis at a consistent level as in the entry and capacity
models. Being aware of potential misspecifications of this approach, we also conduct a
similar estimation on O&D itinerary prices, and find that a $22 premium is charged for
a round-trip ticket in typical duopoly markets. These results regarding price changes
seemingly contradict the explanation based on lower operating costs.
Moreover, we also examine changes in operating costs using changes in load-factors,
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Table 2.8: Fixed Effects Model of Average Segment Fare 1998-2006
(1) (2) (3)
own service quality alliance service quality
difference-in-difference 25.571*** 32.176*** 28.996***
(3.000) (2.865) (5.559)
flight frequency (ln(# of departures)) 17.619*** 18.113***
(ln(# of departures)) (1.043) (1.047)
total capacity (ln(# of seats)) -40.346*** -15.454***
(ln(# of seats)) (1.144) (2.364)
difference-in-difference -4.623
in partner’s flight frequency (3.097)
difference-in-difference 3.020
in partner’s total capacity (1.878)
# obs 14084 14084 14084
R-sq 0.555 0.596 0.601
perhaps the most important driver of operating costs and profitability in the airline
industry (S&P Industry Report). The higher the load-factor, the lower the operating
costs (measured by cost per revenue-passenger-mile) will be. We examine changes in
load-factors again using the same framework of difference-in-difference estimation, and
find that load-factors have decreased dramatically in markets operated with partners,
i.e., down by 3.5 percentage points, while increased in markets operated with competi-
tors, i.e., up by 2.4 percentage points (again measured in the typical duopoly market
example), as shown in Table 2.9 Column 1. These changes in load-factors correspond
to significant changes in costs — a 4.7% increase in costs on markets with partners,
everything else held constant, and a 3.0% decrease in costs on markets with competitors
(computed at the load-factor level of 78%). Summarizing the findings from prices and
load-factors, the argument of reduced operating costs does not seem to be a convincing
explanation for what we observe in the data.
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Table 2.9: Fixed Effects Models for Load-Factor, Total Traffic, and Full Fare Traffic
1998-2006
load-factor traffic % of full fare traffic
change in partner effect -0.077*** 0.033 0.274***
(0.024) (0.028) (0.093)
change in competitor effect 0.053*** -0.169*** 0.297***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.055)
difference-in-difference -0.130*** 0.202*** -0.023
(0.028) (0.031) (0.105)
# obs 14084 14084 14084
Adj R-squared
Within R-sq 0.7499 0.4053 0.6306
2.6.2 Demand Side: Customer Acquisition
Another type of activities that alliance members are generally involved in is related
to customer acquisition: 1) alliances provide better services by offering more options,
smoother connections and shared alliance lounges; and 2) alliances allow consumers
to accumulate and redeem miles on partners’ flights through their reciprocal frequent
flier programs (though certain restrictions may apply). These improvements in service
quality may increase customers’ willingness to pay, or induce more high-value customers
to purchase. That is, alliances may lead to higher prices for reasons other than mutual
forbearance, and these higher margins may provide incentives for airlines to increase
capacity. Based on this logic, we examine the following arguments on the demand side.
Alternative Explanation 3: More flight options and higher frequencies are associ-
ated with better service quality. The potential of charging higher prices for better services
induces airlines to add additional flights in the markets operated with their partners.
While this explanation is consistent with our observations regarding both capacity
expansion and price increases, we examine whether the observed price premium can
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be explained away through these potential changes in service quality. Effects of more
frequent flights might be two-fold: first, by operating additional flights in the markets,
airlines are able to charge higher prices due to the improvement of their own services;
second, by cooperating with their alliance partners, they may be able to charge higher
prices for their partners’ services as well, since consumers can earn and use flying miles
with any airline of the same alliance. We examine the contribution of both mechanisms
to the price premium, and the results from the fixed effects models are shown in Table
2.8. Column 2 shows that airlines are indeed able to charge higher prices for more
frequent services that they provide: the effect of the number of departures (a proxy of
service frequency) is significantly positive, while controlling for the total number of seats
supplied. However, this does not diminish the price premium charged in markets shared
with partners. Meanwhile, Column 3 presents no evidence that airlines are charging
additional premium for services provided by their partners: the price premium is still as
high as $13.0. Based on these results, we conclude that the quality argument does not
explain away our findings regarding price premium. That is, even after controlling for
the potential changes in service quality, partners still benefit from the additional pricing
power developed from the multimarket contact.
Alternative Explanation 4: After an alliance is formed, partners experience
higher demand flowing through their networks, which leads airlines to increase network
overlap, expand capacities, and charge higher prices.
To see whether this explanation might be plausible, we examine changes in traf-
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fic volumes using the difference-in-difference framework. The results from fixed effects
models are shown in Table 2.9. Contrary to the prediction of higher demand, we do
not observe any significant increase in traffic volume in markets with partners. Recall
that we documented a capacity increase of 420 seats per week. Nevertheless, there is no
sizable increase in traffic (i.e., a statistically insignificant increase of 50 passengers per
week). Conversely, in the markets in which competitors are present, traffic decreases
by 260 passengers per week after capacity is reduced by 320 seats per week. Although
the difference-in-difference term is significantly positive, note that we do not observe
first-hand evidence of increasing demand in markets operated with partners. The sig-
nificant difference-in-difference term can be explained by shrinking capacity in markets
with competitors: a reduction of 320 seats per week corresponds to a decrease of 250
passengers per week at the average level of load-factor, i.e., 0.78. One may still suspect
that potential increases in demand might have been offset by increases in prices. How-
ever, if we hypothesize that increasing demand is the driving force, it is unlikely that
prices will offset all changes in demand, as demand changes are the first order effect.
Summarizing these two points, we conclude that the demand argument does not provide
a plausible explanation to our findings.
Alternative Explanation 5: After an alliance is formed, the composition of de-
mand changes. In markets jointly operated with partners, airlines attract more high-value
customers with better services, which allows them to charge higher average prices.
To study this explanation, we examine changes in the composition of travelers. The
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DB1B fare data provides some limited information on fareclasses: restricted fare or
unrestricted fare (i.e., full fare). We obtain the percentage of passengers traveling on full
fares and adopt the difference-in-difference framework to examine how this percentage
is affected by alliances. The results from the fixed effects model are presented in Table
2.9, Column 3. The difference-in-difference term is insignificant and negative, providing
no support to the presumption that there is an increase in the proportion of high-
value customers. We conclude that there is no evidence to support changes in demand
composition.
To summarize, we examined five most plausible alternative explanations of our results
based on both supply and demand effects of alliances. However, none of them provides
compelling explanations to our findings.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the changes of airlines’ entry and capacity decisions after col-
laborating with other airlines through alliances. While theoretical models of operational
decisions suggest that a decrease of competition (e.g., due to the alliance) will reduce
the inventory or production level, we find exactly the opposite. Specifically, we find
that, as the level of competition is reduced by the alliance, partners seek to overlap
among themselves and increase capacities in markets in which they cooperate, while
doing exactly the opposite in the markets operated by competitors from different al-
liances. These surprising findings are consistent with predictions of the multimarket
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competition theory — an important feature of the airline industry and of many other
industries. Multimarket contact enables firms to form mutual forbearance and compete
less aggressively. To enjoy the benefits of the multimarket contact, firms will strategi-
cally choose which market to operate in and how much capacity to install based on their
competitors’ network. This explains the changes in airlines’ operational strategies that
we observe post alliances: airlines seek to establish and strengthen multimarket contact
with their alliance partners which, in turn, leads to less aggressive competition among
alliance partners and allows them to charge an $11 premium on average on a one-way
segment coupon.
To confirm that multimarket competition is indeed the explanation for our findings,
we carefully examine several competing explanations that are most plausible, building
on theories of inventory and service competition and on the supply and demand side
effects commonly cited as the main benefits of airline alliances. However, none of these
alternatives is able to provide full support to what we observe. We therefore conclude
that our findings are most likely driven by the multimarket competition.
Our findings have important implications both theoretically and empirically. The-
oretically, we highlight the importance of incorporating the perspective of multimarket
competition into analysis of operational decisions. Even though multimarket contact
has been a well-studied topic in industrial organization economics and strategy, oper-
ations management community is yet to identify its implications on firms’ operational
strategies. Empirically, we also point out important research opportunities to study the
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impacts of multimarket competition in various industrial settings, such as airlines, banks,
retail chains, and multi-plant manufacturers. Findings from various industries will help
reconcile competing theories and offer insights to future theory developments. Finally,
we draw attention of industry managers and regulators to possible anti-competitive ef-
fects of the airline alliances and the necessity to track evolution of the alliances after
they are formed.
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Chapter 3
Are Consumers Strategic?
Structural Estimation from the
Air-Travel Industry
3.1 Introduction
When was the last time you passed on an immediate purchase to wait for a sale? This
can be a smart choice as inter-temporal price fluctuations are common across industries:
fashion items are marked down several times towards the end of the season; storable
goods are periodically put on sale; prices for high-tech gadgets with short life cycles
dip soon after release; airlines, hotels, car rentals and theaters regularly revise prices
or launch promotions. Of course, there are also consumers who do not strategize over
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the timing of purchase simply because they are not aware of the possibility that price
decreases, have high waiting costs, or are not willing to forgo immediate gains in exchange
for uncertain future gains. We will refer to strategic or forward-looking consumers as
those who maximize long-run utility by strategically timing their purchases to obtain
lower prices. We also refer to myopic and non-strategic consumers as those who maximize
immediate utility and hence do not exhibit strategic behavior.
Studying strategic consumer behavior is important for several reasons. First, very
little research to date provides direct and rigorous evidence of such behavior, relying in-
stead on anecdotal accounts. Empirical evidence of strategic consumer behavior would
not only enrich our knowledge of consumer behavior but also improve managerial deci-
sions, such as pricing and inventory management. Second, most current demand fore-
casting models, including those used in airline revenue management systems, assume
that consumer arrivals are exogenous and inter-temporally independent. However, cor-
rectly incorporating inter-temporal demand substitution may improve the accuracy of
demand forecasting. Finally, revenue implications of strategic consumers could be sig-
nificant. The common belief is that the presence of strategic consumers shifts demand
from high to low prices, thus hurting revenues, but the extent of this effect is unclear:
how to price and manage seat inventory in the presence of strategic consumers continues
to puzzle industry professionals.
The air-travel industry is a particularly interesting test bed to study strategic con-
sumer behavior. Unlike price fluctuations for seasonal or technological products, inter-
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temporal changes in airfares are much harder to predict. It is no longer surprising to
learn that the person seated next to you on a plane paid much less for essentially the
same seat. Revenue management, the practice of bucketing airfares into multiple classes
and managing seat inventory dynamically, has revolutionized pricing (Talluri and van
Ryzin 2005, Boyd 2007). Airlines constantly recompute protection levels and bid prices
by taking into account the current number of available seats and latest demand fore-
casts, which results in constant opening, closing, and reopening of fare classes. Inventory
managers can also override revenue management systems based on their expertise and
local knowledge of demand. Moreover, the pricing department revises fares periodically
in response to changes in demand patterns, operating costs, and competitors’ actions.
Sometimes, pricing managers will launch temporal sales, which may trigger industry-
wide price wars and further add to price swings. Therefore, even the same inventory
class may not always be priced at the same level. All of this is likely to trigger fare
shopping on the consumer side.
Despite this volatile nature of airfares, consumers are not helpless. Proliferation of
web tools, e.g., major online travel agents (e.g., Expedia, Orbitz), fare aggregators (e.g.,
Kayak, Sidestep), and opaque channels (e.g., Hotwire, Priceline) have made it much
easier for consumers to compare prices. Microsoft Bing/Travel (formerly Farecast) even
makes a suggestion to “wait” or “buy” based on the probability of prices going up or
down within the next seven booking days, with 75% accuracy on average. Moreover,
traditional oﬄine agencies, which are often experienced and know the quirks of price
movements, may help consumers obtain better deals in order to increase customer loyalty.
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Based on our spot checks of various travel-related online forums, some travelers have
reported savings of $20 to $150 (or 7% to 33%) by waiting for a better deal. Of course,
consumers are not always that smart — there are also cases in which travelers reported
that they had to pay more since the price actually went up instead of going down.
In this paper, we merge two separate data sources to investigate just how strategic
consumers actually are. First, we have collected information on posted rather than
transacted prices. This is important because in order to investigate strategic consumer
behavior we need to know prices that were available. Second, many industries where one
would suspect strategic consumer behavior have fragmented distribution channels. This
normally limits access to sales information to a few retailers and makes it hard to obtain
a complete picture of prices. In contrast, we are able to utilize booking information
from Global Distribution Systems (GDSs), covering all bookings made through online
and oﬄine travel agents.
We use a simple yet flexible structural model to account for the dynamics caused
by strategic consumers. Unlike most other empirical papers which incorporate forward-
looking behaviors (e.g., Erdem and Keane 1996), our model does not impose the as-
sumption of strategic consumer behavior a priori. We account for both static and dy-
namic price endogeneity, which cannot be easily addressed with reduced-form regres-
sions. Moreover, our framework is flexible enough to incorporate many extensions with
respect to consumer behavior, and it allows us to examine revenue implications through
counterfactual analysis. Our structural estimation results suggest that 4.9% to 44.9%
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of travelers are strategic across different city-pair markets, measured by the 5th and
95th percentiles. This fraction varies by the time to departure in a non-linear fashion —
most strategic consumers arrive either at the very beginning of the booking horizon or
close to departure. Based on the estimation results, we draw important implications for
airline revenue management strategies. Surprisingly, it turns out that the presence of
strategic consumers does not always hurt revenues, since firms get incremental sales from
strategic consumers who otherwise would not buy if myopic. Strategic behavior tends
to decrease revenues in business markets but may increase revenues in leisure markets.
As a result, commitment to a non-decreasing pricing scheme turns out to be desirable
in business markets but not necessarily in leisure markets. Among markets benefiting
from this pricing strategy, the median revenue improvement is 3.5%, and the lower and
the upper quartiles are 1.8% and 5.6%, comparable to revenue improvements commonly
reported (see Talluri and van Ryzin 2005).
3.2 Literature Review
It is a common practice to assume an exogenous demand process in traditional revenue
management research (e.g., Belobaba 1989, Gallego and van Ryzin 1994). Recently,
however, there is a growing interest in studying operational decisions in the presence
of strategic consumers (see Shen and Su 2007, Netessine and Tang 2009 for a review).
Several papers have investigated the impact of strategic consumers on firms’ strategies
such as inventory procurement (Cachon and Swinney 2009), capacity rationing (Liu and
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van Ryzin 2008), and revenue management (Jerath et al. 2010), to name a few. One
of the key findings from the modeling literature is that strategic consumers may exert
a negative impact on firms’ revenue: Anderson and Wilson (2003) find a 7% revenue
loss; Aviv and Pazgal (2008) find a 20% revenue loss; Levin et al. (2009) find a 1% to
7% revenue loss. Nevertheless, other papers predict that strategic consumers can have
either adverse or positive effects on seller revenue (Su 2007, Cho et al. 2008).
Despite the burgeoning interests from the modeling perspective, empirical evidence
of strategic consumers is scarce and scattered in three streams of related literature.
First, in the realm of revenue management, a few recent empirical papers study con-
sumers’ choices among multiple products (Vulcano et al. 2010, Newman et al. 2010)
but without accounting for inter-temporal choice behavior. Second, in marketing and
economics there is a stream of literature that incorporates forward-looking consumer
behavior, starting with Erdem and Keane (1996). More recent papers include Hendel
and Nevo (2006) and Nair (2007), to name a few. However, most of these papers build
on the premise that consumers are forward-looking a priori, and the research objective
is to uncover consumer preferences rather than to investigate how strategic consumers
are. Third, behavioral economists have long been looking at inter-temporal choices and
time-discounting. Recent work by Osadchiy and Bendoly (2010) reports that 38% of
the subjects behave rationally in laboratory experiments by strategically timing their
purchases.
To provide evidence of strategic consumer behavior, there are at least two potential
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estimation approaches. The first approach is to estimate a discount factor (or equiva-
lently, a cost of waiting) as a continuous measure of consumer patience (e.g., Levin et al.
2009). There are two difficulties associated with this approach — identification and
computational complexity. In the aforementioned empirical studies of dynamic models,
utility functions cannot be identified (non-parametrically) when the discount factor is
not fixed (see Rust 1994, Magnac and Thesmar 2002). Although parametric restrictions
will allow utility functions and the discount factor to be identified jointly, the compu-
tational complexity usually makes it undesirable to do so. As a result, the common
practice is to fix the value of the discount factor and conduct sensitivity analysis on this
value, if necessary. The other approach is to segment the market into discrete consumer
types — myopic and strategic (e.g.,Su 2007), and to estimate the fraction of strategic
consumers. A similar idea has been applied in the latent class models in the marketing
literature (Dillon and Kumar 1994). This approach greatly streamlines the estimation.
Meanwhile, it is analogous to market segmentation and can be easily explained to and
understood by industry professionals, so we adopt this approach.
Given the difficulty in identifying strategic behavior and the lack of appropriate field
data, so far very little research provides direct evidence of strategic consumers. To
the best of our knowledge, there are only two studies parallel to this paper. Chevalier
and Goolsbee (2009) test whether textbook users are forward-looking by anticipating
book revisions. They take the discount factor approach since the structure of the value
function is much simpler in this setting. Another example is an unpublished paper
by Hendel and Nevo (2011), who propose a demand anticipation model to account for
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consumer stockpiling behavior during temporary sales and obtain an estimate of the
fraction of stockpilers. Our work is related to theirs as we also look at aggregate data
and the model bears similar structure, but we differ in three aspects. First, the research
objective is different. We start out with the purpose of documenting whether consumers
are strategic or not, while their focus is the inter-temporal price discrimination as a
mechanism of market segmentation. As a result, we ask different questions oriented
towards strategic consumers: What factors affect the fraction of strategic consumers?
What if more consumers become strategic? What pricing strategies may airlines adopt in
response to strategic consumers? Second, prices are more volatile and harder to predict
in the airline industry, and hence the existence of strategic consumer behavior is less
obvious. Significant amount of price dispersion (Clemons et al. 2002, Chellappa et al.
2011) and inter-temporal fluctuation (Etzioni et al. 2003, Mantin and Gillen 2011) has
been documented in the air-travel industry. Third, demand is relatively stable over time
in their setting, and therefore price endogeneity is less of a concern. However, in our
setting, due to the practice of revenue management, price endogeneity is an important
issue that needs to be properly addressed.
To sum up, our study contributes to several streams of literature. Assembling field
data to uncover inter-temporal choices is a significant challenge due to the level of detail
and multiple data sources required. Our data is unique in this sense because it provides
a detailed dynamic view of daily available prices and realized demand. Moreover, the
structural model we propose is simple yet flexible, and at the same time it is consis-
tent with aforementioned modeling literature, so our approach can be used to calibrate
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subsequent models.
3.3 Data
We use two main datasets with millions of records that provide information on airfares
and bookings, respectively. First, fares were web-crawled from the major online travel
agencies: Expedia, Travelocity, Orbitz, and Priceline. The dataset contains posted
fares over a three-month booking period before each day of departure for each city-pair
market. The departure dates are a random set of seven weeks including both peak and
off-peak weeks in the spring travel season of 2005. On each booking day, we extract
the three lowest round-trip (with seven-day length of stay) fares from each online travel
agency for each particular market and departure date. A fare record contains: booking
date, departure date, origin and destination airports, carrier, inventory class, fare type,
fare amount, booking agency, and other details of the itinerary. We have also validated
the web-crawled fare information by matching it with transaction prices obtained from a
corporate sponsor in the same time period (matched with a correlation of 0.860). Second,
booking data from the Marketing Information Data Transfer (MIDT) is obtained from
an airline corporate sponsor. It contains U.S. point-of-sale reservations made in all
major GDSs. GDSs distribute a large proportion of airline tickets via oﬄine and online
travel agents, accounting for 50% to 70% of all sales in the U.S., so we are able to
ensure that sales information is available for most distribution channels. Markets are
selected based on the largest passenger volume for the airline sponsor while ensuring wide
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geographic coverage of cities with large populations. These markets represent about 80%
of market coverage for the airline. The dataset contains the following information on the
outbound leg of all economy-class reservations: reservation date, departure date, origin
and destination airports, carrier, inventory class, the booking agency, and number of
passengers. The data provide a relatively comprehensive view of air-ticket reservations
including their time stamps. Note that MIDT does not contain price information, so we
merge it with the web-crawled price information. Whenever needed, we supplement this
data using other publicly available sources, such as the DB1B 10% air ticket sample from
the Department of Transportation and population and income data from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis.
In sum, there are 5.9 million booking records and 4.5 million fare records. We
merge the two datasets according to markets, departure date and booking date. Thus,
the combined dataset provides a nearly complete picture of daily ticket sales and daily
lowest fares for 111 city-pair markets (84 domestic), 45 departure dates, and a three-
month booking period for each departure date. In this paper we focus on inter-temporal
decisions and aggregate the data across airlines. We could explicitly consider substitution
among different flights and carriers on the demand side and airline competition on the
supply side. We do not possess data to fully implement this approach since we would
need price histories associated with all outbound and inbound flight combinations of all
airlines. Additionally, complexity of the model increases manyfold because one has to
model and compute the competitive equilibrium among airlines in addition to modeling
consumer expectations. We leave this for future research. Based on our preliminary
62
analysis, however, we believe that modeling these aspects is secondary since our focus is
on the inter-temporal substitution: we did attempt to control for the competition level
in a crude way but found no significant effects, as we demonstrate later.
Even though we have taken great effort to assemble this massive database, note that
this data is aggregate data in that we observe only the daily purchases and available
prices, not individual search behavior. However, in most circumstances, firms have
access only to aggregate data such as we have here, in which case structural estimations
are appropriate to infer strategic consumer behavior. We further aggregate the data
by booking week for the following reasons: First, this aggregation level is consistent
with industry practices and with related papers (Mantin and Gillen 2011, Hendel and
Nevo 2011, Granados et al. 2012): a common practice to construct a fare class is to
require 21-/14-/7-day advance purchase. As a result, price varies more from week to
week than from day to day as we will demonstrate. Second, one would expect that even
myopic consumers may take a few days before making a purchase decision, and even the
most strategic consumers cannot wait indefinitely. Letting consumers make purchase
decisions at the weekly level allows us to account for air-travel planning horizons of
both myopic and strategic consumers to a certain extent. Finally, for reasons to be
explained later, aggregation at a lower level would make estimation prohibitively complex
computationally.
We note significant amount of price variation from the data. The overall standard
deviation of prices is about 80% of the mean, as shown in Table 3.1. To further inves-
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of Demand and Price
mean std min max
total passengers by market departure date 90.1 110.0 0 1436
weekly passengers 6.4 13.3 0 309
weekly average fare (weighted)($) 370.35 288.58 110.33 4284.33
Table 3.2: Fare Fluctuations over Markets/Departure Dates/Booking Time
decrease(fraction) no change(fraction) increase(fraction)
daily lowest fare
mean 0.279 0.472 0.249
weekly fare (average of daily lowest fare)
mean 0.395 0.093 0.512
range by market [0.170, 0.561] [0.004, 0.363] [0.322, 0.630]
range by departure date [0.300, 0.477] [0.042, 0.153] [0.408, 0.644]
by booking week 1 0.450† 0.175 0.375
2 0.499 0.135 0.367
3 0.474 0.138 0.388
4 0.413 0.133 0.454
5 0.449 0.106 0.445
6 0.435 0.084 0.481
7 0.446 0.071 0.483
8 0.425 0.076 0.499
9 0.460 0.080 0.460
10 0.456 0.073 0.471
11 0.198 0.035 0.767
12 0.035 0.006 0.959
† : Fare decreases with 0.450 probability from week 1 to week 2.
tigate the inter-temporal component of the price variation, we summarize frequencies
of price trends in Table 3.2. On average, the weekly fare decreases in the subsequent
week with 39.5% probability, increases with 51.2% probability, and remains constant
with 9.3% probability. In comparison, most often (47.2% of the time) the daily fare
stays unchanged. This probability varies significantly by market, departure date and
booking week. This persistent inter-temporal variation underscores the uncertainty in
prices faced by air-travel consumers, and also the potential opportunities for consumers
to strategize on the timing of purchase.
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3.4 Preliminary Results using Reduced-Form Re-
gressions
Before formulating the structural model, we first look at preliminary results from reduced-
form regressions, which highlight the potential endogeneity problems and lead us to the
structural approach. In the absence of strategic consumers, demand dt in period t is
correlated with the price of that period pt, but not with prices of past or future periods,
everything else being properly controlled for. However, when some consumers strate-
gically postpone their purchase decisions in anticipation of a price decrease, demand
will be correlated with past and future prices. The lower the future prices or expected
future prices, the more likely consumers are willing to delay their purchases. To test
this, we estimate weekly demand using the following three models: 1) a basic model that
accounts only for the price of the current week, 2) a model that accounts for realized
future and past prices, and 3) a model that accounts for expected prices. To show the
primary effects, we consider prices only one period (i.e., one week) ahead:
dt = α + β0pt +Xγ + εt, (3.1)
dt = α + β0pt + β1pt+1 + β2pt−1 +Xγ + εt, (3.2)
dt = α + β0pt + β1pˆt+1 + β2pt−1 + β3pˆt +Xγ + εt, (3.3)
where the X includes covariates such as polynomials of booking time and market depar-
ture date characteristics; see Table 3.3 for a description of these variables. Controlling
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for the realized future and past prices, Model 3.2 corresponds to the case in which strate-
gic consumers have perfect knowledge about future prices. We expect β1 and β2 to be
positive if there is inter-temporal substitution. However, consumers most likely do not
have perfect knowledge of future prices, but rather make predictions of future prices
based on historical prices and other information available. We control for the expected
prices pˆt+1 and pˆt in Model 3.3. Expected prices are obtained using four period lags
of prices and other market covariates, which together explain up to 80% to 90% of the
price variations. Strategic consumers who arrive at time t − 1 will base their timing of
purchase on price pt−1 and the expected price pˆt. The coefficient β1, β2 in Model 3.3
should have the same sign as in Model 3.2, while the coefficient β3 of pˆt should have a
sign opposite to β2.
Table 3.3: Variable Descriptions
Category Variable
(1) Reduced-Form Regressions and Baseline Demand Model
price weekly price: average of daily lowest prices within a week
booking time polynomials of booking week; final booking week dummy before departure
departure date characteristics high-demand season; day-of-week dummies
(2) Predicting the Probability of Prices Falling for Weak-Form Rational Expectation
relative prices current to last: current week price divided by final week price
current to initial: current week price divided by the first week price
current to mktavg: current week price divided by the average market price
price volatility the coefficient of variance of the daily prices in the current week
initial price initial price
other measures booking time and departure day characteristics
(3) Supply Model, Strong-Form Rational Expectation
price history price lagged by one period
demand history cumulative demand
initial price initial price
other measures booking time and departure day characteristics
We run regressions on a sample market and present the results in Table 3.4. All signs
are as expected except for that of the lagged price in Model 3.2, largely supporting our
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belief about the presence of strategic consumers. The results tell us how sensitive the
current demand is to prices in adjacent time periods. Although this simple approach
is indicative of the presence of strategic consumers, it suffers from several drawbacks.
First is the price endogeneity commonly seen in static settings. The current price may
be correlated with the current demand shock as firms usually have better knowledge
of demand shocks than we do as econometricians, leading to positively biased price
sensitivities. Second, the dynamics add an additional layer to price endogeneity. For
example, in Model 3.2, the positive correlation between demand dt and future price pt+1
can be explained either as strategic consumers waiting for prices to drop or as prices
drop as a result of previously realized low demand, again biasing the price sensitivity
positively. Using expected prices instead of realized prices may alleviate but not fully
resolve this problem. The expected future price can still be correlated with demand
shocks through the current price, which again introduces positive bias in price sensitiv-
ities. In fact, we do find many insignificant price coefficients for many markets. Since
all price variables are endogenous, we would need multiple Instrument Variables (IVs),
and finding IVs in this setting is not trivial because they would need to vary across the
booking periods. Cost-based supply shifters (e.g., fuel prices and labor costs) are not
useful because weekly prices do not respond to these cost factors in the short run. Other
IVs used in airline studies, such as distance and demographics (Borenstein and Rose.
1994, Granados et al. 2012) are not applicable either since they do not vary over the
booking period.
In addition to the endogeneity problem, it is also not clear how to explain the esti-
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Table 3.4: Reduced-Form Regressions of Demand on (Expected) Future and Past Prices
(1) (2) (3)
current price realized future expected prices
and past prices
price (pt) -0.044 -0.081 -0.177
(0.021) (0.041) (0.046)
pt+1 0.150
(0.026)
pt−1 -0.087 0.362
(0.041) (0.165)
expected price pˆt+1 0.300
(0.040)
pˆt -0.463
(0.171)
booking time t 4.224 -1.187 9.783
(2.695) (2.748) (4.762)
t2 -0.985 0.147 -1.834
(0.472) (0.491) (0.921)
t3 0.088 0.022 0.122
(0.024) (0.026) (0.050)
final week 25.113 84.738 145.341
(5.222) (12.166) (17.367)
high season 4.450 3.419 5.875
(2.102) (2.050) (2.358)
day-of-week dummies yes yes yes
const 8.740 8.893 -16.116
(6.681) (7.287) (8.989)
R-square 0.7300 0.7466 0.7554
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
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mated coefficients (e.g., β1, β3): although one would get a sense of how sensitive demand
is to adjacent prices, it is hard to get a sense of how strategic consumers are from these
estimates, especially if we want to compare them across markets. In sum, although
reduced-form regressions seem to provide some evidence of varying prices and strategic
consumer behavior, these simple models cannot properly address multiple econometric
issues. We turn next to the structural modeling approach.
3.5 The Structural Model
3.5.1 The Demand Model
We first consider the decision of a consumer who desires to travel in a particular city-pair
market on a particular departure date. We assume that both the market and the day of
departure are given exogenously. To focus on the inter-temporal substitution, we further
ignore substitution between nearby airports and among adjacent departure dates16. In
our model, needs for travel arise exogenously. A consumer arriving at booking time t
can be either strategic (with probability θ) or myopic (with probability 1− θ). Our goal
is to obtain an estimate of the fraction of strategic consumers (i.e., θ) in the population.
Myopic consumers are those who arrive at t and immediately make a purchase-or-not
decision. If a myopic consumer decides not to buy at time t, he will never come back.
Strategic consumers are those who arrive at t but may decide to postpone their purchase
16Capturing those types of substitutions would require different types of data, and is outside of the
scope of this paper.
69
and come back later. For computational reasons, we make a conservative assumption
that strategic consumers wait for at most one period of time17. Should she decide to
wait, she will come back later and decide whether or not to purchase the ticket. The
waiting decision of a strategic consumer depends on her expectation of future prices,
which we discuss later. Consumers in our model are heterogeneous along the following
three dimensions: 1) time of arrival (e.g., Su 2007, Aviv and Pazgal 2008); 2) strategic
or myopic (e.g., Su 2007, Cachon and Swinney 2009); and 3) valuation of the products
(e.g., Levin et al. 2009). Valuation does not affect waiting decisions in our model as
we discuss shortly. Furthermore, we will allow for different price sensitivities between
strategic and myopic consumers to incorporate heterogeneity in valuation distributions
among them.
Knowing the consumers’ problem, we model the aggregate demand observed in each
booking period. The aggregate demand dmt on a city-pair market and departure date
dyad m and at booking time t is composed of three subgroups: 1) myopic consumers
who arrive and decide to buy at time t; 2) strategic consumers who arrive and decide
to buy at time t; 3) strategic consumers who arrive at time t− 1 but wait for one more
period and finally decide to buy at time t. Specifically,
dmt = (1− θ)q(pmt, Xm, t) + θ(1− zmt)q(pmt, Xm, t) + θzm,t−1q(pmt, Xm, t− 1) (3.4)
17Estimation with two or more waiting periods is extremely expensive computationally. We tried
allowing for two-period waiting under simpler expectation assumptions, perfect foresight and weak-
form rational expectation. The estimated percentage is comparable while slightly smaller. However,
the amount of strategic waiting, i.e., (amount of time waiting) * (number of people waiting), is almost
the same.
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where zmt equals 1 if a strategic consumer decides to wait at time t, and 0 otherwise,
and q(·) is the baseline demand that one would observe if all consumers were myopic.
Note that the model itself does not impose the assumption of strategic behavior: only if
θ is significantly different from zero will we have the evidence of strategic behavior. The
baseline demand is a function of price pmt, market and departure-date characteristics
Xm, and the time of booking t. Note that the effective price for those consumers who
arrive in the last period t − 1 but wait until t is the current price pmt rather than
the last period’s price pm,t−1. That is, strategic consumers who decide to wait are not
obligated to buy when they come back, and the decision will depend on the new price
they see. Thus, the demand contribution from those who arrive in the previous period is
q(pmt, Xm, t−1) rather than q(pm,t−1, Xm, t−1). In the following subsections, we discuss
in detail the modeling alternatives, assumptions, and potential extensions of each input
of this model.
Baseline Demand
Functional Form. The baseline demand q(pmt, Xm, t) represents the potential demand
we will observe if all consumers are myopic. A common way to model demand is the
additive linear demand model: q(pmt, Xm, t) = α− βpmt + f(t) +Xmδ+ εmt, where f(t)
captures the time trend approximated, for instance, by a polynomial function of booking
time t, and εmt is the demand shock. The main results of this paper will be based on the
linear model, but we also present results with the nonlinear exponential demand model
with multiplicative errors: q(pmt, Xm, t) = exp
(
α− βpmt + f(t) +Xmδ + εmt
)
.
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Endogeneity of Price and Structure of Demand Shocks. Even though we
control for market-departure-date characteristics, prices may still be endogenous in this
setting. First, pricing managers who monitor the demand and prices have better knowl-
edge about the local demand than we do as econometricians. For example, when there
is a special event, such as a conference or a convention, managers might adjust prices
for that departure date and city accordingly. Second, pricing managers adjust prices
based on previously realized demand shocks, and if demand shocks are auto-correlated,
prices will be correlated with contemporaneous demand shocks as well. These particular
features of the air-travel industry make price endogeneity a more prominent issue than
in many other industries, such as the one studied in Hendel and Nevo (2011) where de-
mand is more stable over time. Failure to address these endogeneity issues will result in
biased estimates of price sensitivity, and hence the estimates of other parameters of the
model such as the fraction of strategic consumers. The direction of this bias can go both
ways. If price endogeneity is not properly accounted for, as usual, price sensitivities will
be underestimated. During price drops, a part of the incremental demand caused by the
price sensitivity of myopic consumers will be attributed to strategic consumers, so the
fraction of strategic consumers will be overestimated. During price surges, however, the
observed decrease in demand is smaller with strategic consumers than without them.
Since the potential decrease in demand without strategic consumers is underestimated,
the part attributed to the strategic consumers, that is, potential decrease minus ob-
served decrease, will be underestimated. The overall effect is ambiguous. To address the
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endogeneity, we allow for the following structure of demand shocks:
εmt = µm + mt, (3.5)
mt = ρm,t−1 + νmt, (3.6)
where the demand shock εmt is decomposed to a market-departure-date specific shock,
µm, and a serially correlated shock governed by AR(1) process, mt. Price pt is allowed
to be correlated with the demand shock εmt through correlation with µm and m,t−1. The
remaining part of the demand shock, νmt, is a pure noise, i.i.d across markets, departure
dates and booking periods, and uncorrelated with other observables, including prices.
Heterogeneity in Price Sensitivities between Myopic and Strategic Con-
sumers. One might expect strategic consumers to be more sensitive to prices than
non-strategic consumers. To allow for this possibility, let βn and βs denote the price
sensitivities of non-strategic and strategic consumers, respectively. The demand can be
written as follows,
dmt = (1− θ)qn(pmt, Xm, t) + θ(1− zmt)qs(pmt, Xm, t)
+θzm,t−1qs(pmt, Xm, t− 1),
qn(pmt, Xm, t) = α− βnpmt + f(t) +Xmδ + εmt,
qs(pmt, Xm, t) = α− βspmt + f(t) +Xmδ + εmt.
Now we need to be careful about the interpretation of the fraction θ. In the previous
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case where strategic and non-strategic consumers have the same price sensitivities, the
fraction of strategic consumers is constant regardless of prices. However, the observed
fraction will change with prices if different price sensitivities are permitted. The higher
the price, the fewer strategic consumers we expect to observe. Thus, the fraction θ
represents the relative scale of strategic consumers at price zero. We define the observed
fraction of strategic consumer θobs,t at time t as θobs,t = qs(pmt, Xm, t)/qn(pmt, Xm, t).
Consumer Expectations.
Strategic consumers’ waiting decision is based on their beliefs about future prices. Note
that price levels also manifest the risk of stock-out thanks to the practice of revenue
management. Bid prices, as approximated by the lowest prices in our model, reflect
the level of remaining seat inventory or the probability of stock-out at different booking
occasions. We model consumers’ waiting decision under three different circumstances
with a decreasing level of consumer sophistication: perfect foresight, strong-form rational
expectations and weak-form rational expectations. Under perfect foresight consumers
predict future prices perfectly. Under rational expectations, consumers cannot predict
the exact price individually, yet as a group they predict the future price distribution
correctly. The distinction between strong form and weak form is that, under the strong-
form, consumers consider airlines’ pricing strategy when forming the expectation, while
under the weak-form, the expectation is based on historical information only.
Perfect Foresight. At time t, strategic consumers know the exact future price
pm,t+1. Though unrealistic, this model can be used as a benchmark. Consider a consumer
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with utility of traveling denoted by φ. She will decide to wait if φ − pm,t+1 > φ − pmt,
or pm,t+1 < pmt, that is, if price drops in the next period. Note that time discounting is
negligible in this setting since we are looking at relatively short time periods such as days
or weeks. Moreover, utility of air-travel does not depend on the time of purchase: the
product is always consumed on the day of departure. As a result, a consumer’s purchase-
or-wait decision is not dependent on the value of the product φ. Moreover, when a
consumer anticipates future prices perfectly, risk attitude will not be a determinant of
the purchase-or-wait decision.
Weak-Form Rational Expectation. A strategic consumer i makes a prediction
of the future price pm,t+1 at time t based on information available to her at time t, i.e.,
Imt and a personal shock, i.e., oimt, p˜i,m,t+1 = E[pm,t+1|Imt]+oi,mt, where E[pm,t+1|Imt] is
the expectation of future prices given information set Imt. Information set Imt includes,
for instance, historical prices, price volatility, and market departure date characteristics.
Under the rational expectation assumption, the distribution of consumer belief p˜i,m,t+1 is
the same as that of the true conditional distribution of future price pm,t+1|Imt. Therefore,
the probability that strategic consumers wait will be the same as Pr(pm,t+1 < pmt|Imt),
which can be estimated using a Logit or Probit model.
Strong-Form Rational Expectation. Consumers now consider airlines’ pricing
strategy when forming expectation of future prices. Consider the following game played
by the airline and the consumers. Stage 1: at the beginning of time t, baseline demand
shock νmt is realized, and consumers arrive and see the pmt. Myopic consumers make
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their purchase based on pmt. Each strategic consumer forms her own prediction of future
price and makes the purchase-or-wait decision. Total demand dmt is thus realized. Stage
2: at the beginning of time t+1, a supply shock denoted by ωm,t+1 is realized and airlines
make a decision on price pm,t+1 based on the previous demands dmk, k = 1, 2, ..., t, the
observed supply shock ωm,t+1 and other inputs.
In the rational expectations equilibrium, strategic consumers collectively anticipate
the true price distribution. Consumers do not necessarily need to know the exact demand
shock νmt. As long as it is realized, this information will not be wasted in an efficient
market. The only source of variation for the price pm,t+1 at the time when consumers form
expectations is the unrealized supply shock. With this assumption, the equilibrium belief
of future price distribution and probability of waiting can be found through estimating
the supply model, which we describe in the next section.
Under either weak-form or strong-form rational expectation, once we obtain the prob-
ability of strategic consumers waiting Prmt, we can replace zmt with Prmt in Equation
3.4. We note that the rational expectations model is likely to provide higher estimates
of the fraction of strategic consumers than the perfect foresight model. The reason is
that, under the perfect foresight, every strategic consumer anticipates price drops cor-
rectly and waits. Under the rational expectations, only a portion of strategic consumers
correctly anticipate price drops. Thus, the same amount of demand shifting observed in
the data caused by strategic waiting corresponds to more underlying strategic consumers
under the rational expectations assumption.
76
Fraction of Strategic Consumers.
So far we have assumed the fraction of strategic consumers to be time-independent.
However, strategic consumers may be more likely to arrive at certain stages over the
booking horizon. We estimate a vector of fractions for the entire booking horizon non-
parametrically, θ˜ = [θ1, θ2, ..., θT−1], where θt represents the fraction of strategic con-
sumers arriving at the booking time t, and T is the final booking period. Note that no
strategic consumers arrive in the last period before departure, i.e., θT = 0, which is also
true in the case of constant fraction.
3.5.2 The Supply Model
Recall that one reason to specify the supply model (or pricing strategy) is to estimate
the demand model under the strong-form rational expectations. Another reason is that
we need to know the firm’s pricing strategy in order to compute new equilibrium in the
counterfactual analysis as we change certain parameters. Ideally, the most desired sup-
ply model would mimic the exact network-based dynamic inventory control algorithms
and demand forecasting strategies used in the airline industry, and take into account the
effect of competition. Such a dynamic game is far too complex to be amenable both an-
alytically and computationally within the scope of this paper. Moreover, this approach
would invoke an assumption on firms’ current conduct — that they are profit maximiz-
ers and already make the optimal decisions. This may not be the case (e.g., we know
airlines do not currently take strategic consumers into account), and, more important,
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this assumption would make our pricing recommendations redundant. Instead, we take
an empirical approach to approximate the firms’ current equilibrium pricing strategy, as
many other structural models do (e.g., Nair 2007). Note that short-term price fluctua-
tions in the airline industry are not based on costs, as fixed costs are sunk and marginal
costs are minimal. The key determinants of prices are the remaining seat inventory and
demand forecasts (see Gallego and van Ryzin 1994). When restricted to one particular
market, we can account for the remaining inventory level using the cumulative demand
since the total capacity is largely fixed in the short term. We therefore model the price
as a function of previous prices and demands, market and departure date characteristics,
and supply shocks. We find that lag-1 price, initial price pm0, and cumulative demand
up to time t, together with other controls, are able to explain nearly 90% of the price
variations for most markets. We therefore choose the following parsimonious model on
the supply side:
pm,t+1 = γppmt + γdcum demandmt + γ0pm0 +Xm,t+1γ + ωm,t+1, ωm,t+1 ∼ N(0, σm,t+1),
where ωm,t+1 is a random supply shock, which we assume to be uncorrelated with the
demand shock, as the fixed component (µmt) and the autocorrelated component (ρmt)
of the demand shock are accounted for by lag-1 price, cumulative demand, and initial
price. The remaining part of time t + 1 demand shock (νm,t+1) can be assumed to be
uncorrelated with ωm,t+1. We do not find evidence of serial correlation in the residuals
after controlling for the lag-1 price. However, we do find evidence of heteroscedasticity
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in the residuals over booking time, so we allow the variation of the supply shock (σmt)
to change with booking time.
It is important to note at this point how the structural model outperforms the
reduced-form regressions in addressing the econometric issues previously discussed. First,
the mechanism by which expected prices affect current and future demands is explicitly
specified in the structural model, rather than merely through correlations (β1, β3) in
the reduced-form regressions. More important, the error generating process is explicitly
specified as well. As the demand includes both strategic and myopic consumers, the
demand shock is composed of shocks to both groups as well. The shock first affects the
arrival of both strategic and myopic consumers, and then translates into the current and
future demands dependent on the strategic behaviors. In the reduced-form regression,
we have only one blended error term. Even if one can arbitrarily apply techniques to
control for fixed effects and serial correlation in reduced-form regressions, it makes more
sense to specify the underlying error generating process.
3.6 Identification and Estimation
3.6.1 Identification
As we outlined earlier, there is a significant amount of intertemporal price fluctuation
present in the data: in addition to frequent changes in weekly fares, there are also cross-
market, departure-date and booking-week variations. The identification of the fraction
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of strategic consumers θ is based on the variation of price trends. As we explain shortly,
the estimation is conducted for each market separately, so the identification is based on
the variation of price trajectories across booking periods and departure dates within the
same market.
The presence of strategic consumers affects observed demand only when the price
falls or is expected to fall. When the price increases or is expected to increase, strategic
consumers behave in the same way as their myopic counterparts. In this case, variations
in demand are attributed only to price elasticity. However, in the case of price reductions,
variations in demand can be attributed to both price elasticity and strategic consumers.
If we are able to quantify the changes in demand induced by price elasticity, the extra
variations in demand can be attributed to strategic consumers. The question is: how
do we identify price sensitivities and the fraction of strategic consumers separately? To
illustrate this more precisely, recall the model under perfect foresight (Equation 3.4) and
consider the following cases described by waiting decisions zm,t−1 and zmt, equivalent to
price trends under perfect foresight:
Case 1: zm,t−1 = 0, zmt = 0 ⇒ dmt = q(pmt, Xm, t),
Case 2: zm,t−1 = 0, zmt = 1 ⇒ dmt = (1− θ)q(pmt, Xm, t),
Case 3: zm,t−1 = 1, zmt = 0 ⇒ dmt = q(pmt, Xm, t) + θq(pmt, Xm, t− 1),
Case 4: zm,t−1 = 1, zmt = 1 ⇒ dmt = (1− θ)q(pmt, Xm, t) + θq(pmt, Xm, t− 1).
In Case 1, the price keeps rising from time t − 1 to t and to t + 1, so the observed
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sales consists of the baseline demand dmt = q(pmt, Xm, t). Thus, q(·) can be identi-
fied. That is, price sensitivities are identified based on occasions with increasing prices.
Once the baseline demand function is identified, each of the other three cases can help
identify the fraction θ. Precisely, it is the variation in z, i.e., the price trend, that
identifies the fraction of strategic consumers. Note, however, that the fraction θ is
over-identified, since all three cases can help identification. This means that we can
actually identify more parameters, which takes us to the identification of the time-
variant fraction θ˜t, t = 1, 2, ..., T − 1. For example, Cases 2 and 3 can now be written as
dmt = (1− θt)q(pmt, Xm, t) and dmt = q(pmt, Xm, t) + θt−1q(pmt, Xm, t− 1), respectively,
which allows us to identify θt and θt−1.
To see if price sensitivities are still identified when we allow for different sensitivities
between strategic and non-strategic consumers, we again look at different cases classified
by the value of zm,t−1, zmt,
Case 1: zm,t−1 = 0, zmt = 0 ⇒ dmt = −
(
(1− θ)βn + θβs
)
pmt +Xmtγ,
Case 2: zm,t−1 = 0, zmt = 1 ⇒ dmt = −(1− θ)βnpmt + (1− θ)Xmtγ.
From Case 2, we can identify (1− θ)βn, and (1− θ)γ, but not θ, βn, γ separately. From
Case 1, we are able to identify γ from the variation of Xmt
18. Together with (1 − θ)γ
identified in Case 2, we are able to identify θ. Since Case 1 also identifies
(
(1−θ)βn+θβs
)
,
18For simplicity, we include all variables other than price into Xmt, i.e., the constant, polynomials of
t and market-departure-date characteristics Xm.
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together with (1 − θ)βn and θ, we are able to identify βs and βn. Similarly, θ is again
over-identified, since there are other cases based on zm,t−1, zmt which help us identify θ
as well. These over-identification conditions can again be utilized to identify the vector
θ˜t, t = 1, 2, ..., T − 1.
So far we have discussed the identification for models under perfect foresight. In
fact, the same logic also carries over to models under rational expectations since the
only difference is that zmt becomes a probability rather than a dichotomous variable.
The variation in z (now Pr) still serves as the source of identification for θ. More pre-
cisely, under rational expectations, we first fit a model to predict strategic consumers’
probability of waiting, and then use the variation in this probability to identify the frac-
tion of strategic consumers. In summary, we obtain the identification because strategic
consumers behave differently under different expectations of future prices.
3.6.2 Estimation
Note that our demand model is nonlinear in its parameters (θ, β, γ, ρ). The moment
condition used in estimation has the mean independence property19, E[νmt|Xm, pmt] = 0,
which guarantees consistent estimators (see Wooldridge 2010). The key challenges in
estimation are 1) finding the global optimal solution to a minimization problem where
the first order conditions are not linear in parameters, and 2) accounting for fixed effects
19After controlling for fixed effects and serial correlation, it is relatively reasonable to assume that
price is uncorrelated with the remaining part of the error term. We do not find evidence of correlation
between the residuals (νˆmt) and prices (with a correlation less than 0.01). We also considered using
previous cumulative demand and previous demand as instruments. However, they sometime show
stronger correlation with the error terms than prices.
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and serial correlations in error terms in the nonlinear minimization problem. We design
an algorithm and describe it in the appendix. Briefly, the key idea is to first transform
the nonlinear problem into a linear problem to address the error structure given a partial
set of parameters, and then minimize over this parameter set.
We use bootstrapping to obtain the standard errors and confidence intervals.To guar-
antee that all booking periods for a particular departure date in a market are selected
or not selected as a whole, we use clustered bootstrapping. That is, the resampling
is done at the level of market-departure-date rather than booking period. Although
adjacent departure dates in the same markets might not be completely independent,
the correlation is of less concern compared to the correlation of booking periods for the
same departure date. In our data, 250 rounds of bootstraps are sufficient to obtain
convergence in standard error estimations. However, it takes substantially more rounds
(1,000) to obtain an accurate estimate of the confidence interval. Since the estimates
of the fraction of strategic consumers are bounded within [0, 1] and the bootstrapping
distributions of these fractions are largely asymmetric, it is important to bootstrap the
percentile confidence intervals rather than to compute the confidence intervals from
standard errors.
We perform estimation market by market since each market demonstrates signifi-
cantly different patterns of time trends, seasonality, day-of-week effects and price sen-
sitivities. Pooling all markets together without accounting for these differences would
result in misspecification of the baseline demand model, which would further bias the
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estimation of the fraction of strategic consumers. To mitigate this effect we would need
hundreds of market-specific coefficients. Instead, the estimation is more accurate and
efficient when it is performed for each market separately. On average, it took one to five
hours to run 1,000 bootstraps for each market, depending on the model specification.
This amounts to 100 to 500 hours of computation time for each model specification
run over all markets. The long running time is largely due to the non-linearity of the
model, randomized initialization to guarantee global optimality, and the large number
of bootstraps. We code the program in MATLAB and we run it on the Wharton Grid
Computing Platform (a 20-node, 80-CPU Linux grid and cluster environment).
Variables
In this section, we discuss the variables used in the aforementioned models. We provide
a list of these variables and their descriptions in Table 3.3.
Baseline Demand Model. The baseline demand is affected by the following fac-
tors. 1) Price. We use the lowest daily price among multiple candidates for the price
measure. This is a good approximate price point since we care most about strategic
consumers who are presumably in search of the lowest prices. On most booking days,
there is no obvious deviation between the lowest price and, say, the average of the three
lowest prices, except for a few days close to departure. In addition, lowest daily prices
are also a commonly used measure in industry practices (e.g., Farecast) and related pa-
pers (e.g., Mantin and Gillen 2011). To aggregate daily price points to the weekly level,
there are at least two options — the minimum and the average of the lowest daily prices
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within a week. Significant differences mostly appear in the final week before departure,
when prices change rapidly from day to day. For this reason we use the average of the
lowest daily prices as the measure of the weekly price; otherwise, the price sensitivity
in the final weeks before departure is not well captured. 2) Booking time: booking
week and its polynomials, and the final booking week before departure. We use booking
week t, t2, t3 because the incremental explanatory power is minimal when adding higher
polynomial terms. 3) Departure-date characteristics. Due to seasonal demand patterns,
some departure dates have higher demand than others. For example, during the vacation
seasons leisure destinations experience many more travelers than they normally do. We
control for demand seasonality by identifying the high-demand season from the data,
which corresponds roughly to the spring break period. Seasonality is more obvious for
leisure destinations than for business destinations. We also control for the day-of-week
effect of the departure date using dummies. Departures tend to cluster around weekdays
in business markets, and around weekends in leisure markets.
Weak-Form Rational Expectations. In this case the predictors of future prices
include historical prices and other information available to the decision makers. 1)
Relative fares. The current fare relative to the fare of the last period, to the initial fare,
and to the average market fare obtained from the DB1B dataset. 2) Price volatility. The
coefficient of variation of daily fares within a week20. 3) The initial price. Initial prices
are highly correlated with demands across departure dates, which reflects the fact that
20Using standard deviation and coefficient of variation with or without first-differencing yield similar
results.
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fare managers have some knowledge of demand when making the initial pricing decision.
4) Booking time and departure date characteristics.
The Supply Model, Strong-Form Rational Expectations. The variables in-
clude last period price, cumulative demand, the initial price, booking time and departure
date characteristics.
3.7 Results
Our estimations provide consistent findings of strategic consumers across markets under
various model specifications. We first illustrate these findings using different model
specifications applied to two representative markets, and then we summarize them across
all markets. The representative markets include one leisure market, labeled as L, with
Orlando, Florida as the destination and one business market, labeled as B, with Atlanta,
Georgia as the destination. The origins of both markets are disguised for confidentiality
reasons.
3.7.1 Results under Different Baseline Demand Models
In Table 3.5 we compare three different baseline demand models under perfect consumer
foresight: 1) the linear model, 2) the linear model with correction for price endogeneity,
and 3) the nonlinear exponential model21. As we show in the table, all models lead
21We also estimate a nonlinear model with correction for price endogeneity. The performance of this
model turns out to be almost the same as for the basic nonlinear model, but it takes four to five times
longer to estimate due to the high level of non-linearity.
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to similar estimates of the fraction of strategic consumers, about 3% to 5% for this
particular market under perfect foresight. (3.6% under the linear model, 5.2% under the
linear model with endogeneity corrections, and 2.5% under the nonlinear model.) We
select the linear model with endogeneity correction as the basis for subsequent analysis
since it addresses the potential biases associated with the basic linear model and is
computationally more efficient than the nonlinear model. It turns out that the linear
model with endogeneity correction has the best model fit as well in terms of R-square,
explaining 39% of the variation on average, and in some markets as high as 60% to
70%. Comparing the results of the two linear models, we find that, as expected, price
sensitivity is underestimated when the endogeneity issues are not addressed: without
correction for endogeneity the price sensitivity is -0.174, while controlling for endogeneity
it is -0.224. In this particular market, this further leads to an underestimation of the
fraction of strategic consumers, i.e., 0.036 as compared to 0.052. In other markets, we
observe overestimation of the fraction.
The signs of other coefficients are in line with our expectations. We see that the final
week before departure has a strong positive effect on demand, especially in business
markets. Departure date characteristics (seasonality and day-of-week effects) also have
significant effects on total demand. In many markets, the estimated serial correlation
between adjacent demand shocks is large and significant (mildly significant in this market
though), highlighting the importance of controlling for serial correlation.
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Table 3.5: Compare Different Baseline Demand Models (perfect foresight): Market L
(1) (2) (3)
linear linear + fixed nonlinear
effect + AR1
fraction 0.036 0.052 0.025
95% confidence interval [0.000, 0.114] [0.001, 0.122] [0.000, 0.112]
price -0.174 -0.224 -0.005
(0.038) (0.031) (0.001)
booking time t -0.107 -10.293 0.196
(3.300) (3.611) (0.136)
t2 0.811 2.252 -0.003
(0.572) (0.618) (0.025)
t3 -0.047 -0.109 0.000
(0.028) (0.030) (0.001)
final week 8.695 16.266 0.234
(4.063) (4.201) (0.106)
high season 46.345 1.159
(11.125) (0.324)
day-of-week dummies yes yes
const 49.520 3.323
(9.937) (0.536)
AR1(ρ) 0.117
(0.064)
R-square 0.2470 0.3937 0.2478
3.7.2 Results under Different Consumer Expectation Assump-
tions
Now we move on to compare the estimated fractions of strategic consumers under dif-
ferent assumptions about their expectations of future prices; we present the results in
Table 3.6. In this market we find persistent evidence of strategic consumers regardless
of the assumptions about expectations of future prices. Under the benchmark model,
i.e., perfect foresight, the fraction of strategic consumers is significant at 5.2%. Under
the rational expectations assumption, the estimates are higher, as we expected: 29.2%
and 38.5% under strong-form and weak-form rational expectation, respectively. All esti-
mates are statistically significant. Naturally, the results from the rational expectations
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Table 3.6: Results under Different Consumer Expectation Assumptions: Market L
(1) (2) (3)
perfect strong-form weak-form
foresight rational expectation rational expectation
fraction of strategic consumers 0.052 0.292 0.385
95% confidence interval [0.001, 0.122] [0.151, 0.541] [0.198, 0.394]
price -0.224 -0.224 -0.214
(0.031) (0.032) (0.031)
booking time t -10.293 -10.160 -6.814
(3.611) (3.612) (3.542)
t2 2.252 2.328 1.781
(0.618) (0.619) (0.598)
t3 -0.109 -0.117 -0.091
(0.030) (0.030) (0.029)
final week 16.266 20.340 17.263
(4.201) (4.856) (4.416)
AR1(ρ) 0.117 0.033 0.045
(0.064) (0.073) (0.080)
R-square 0.3937 0.4073 0.4215
model are more realistic since it is not possible for consumers to predict future prices
perfectly. One also needs to be cautious when comparing these fractions: although the
estimate under rational expectations can be significantly higher than that under perfect
foresight, it does not necessarily mean more strategic waiting. Ultimately, the demand
shift observed due to strategic consumers is also dependent on consumers’ ability to
make predictions of future prices. Since some consumers are not able to correctly antic-
ipate future prices, they would not behave “strategically” when they should. However,
there is a possibility that with the proliferation of web tools such as fare charts and fare
alerts, consumers are becoming better at making price predictions. The demand shifting
effect will become more prominent in this case. Estimates of other control variables are
consistent across three models and are of expected signs. The results of the prediction
models used in the weak-form and the strong-form rational expectations are shown in
Appendix Table 5.3.
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3.7.3 Heterogeneity in Price Sensitivities
Strategic consumers may have different price sensitivity from myopic consumers. As we
see in the identification section, estimations of price sensitivity and of the fraction of
strategic consumers are closely related to each other. Therefore, there may be a concern
that the fraction of strategic consumers we identify could be partially driven by the
different price sensitivities of these two consumer groups. To investigate this possibility,
we estimate different price sensitivities for strategic and myopic consumers. The results
are shown in Table 3.7. For the leisure Market L, we do not observe significant differences
in the price sensitivities among these two groups, and hence the estimates of strategic
fractions do not change much. However, for the business Market B, we do observe a
significant difference in price sensitivities among these two groups. As we discussed
earlier, the observed fraction θobs of strategic consumers at a particular price point is
not the same as the parameter θ. In Market L, the two estimates are similar since the
difference between the two price sensitivities is small. In Market B, however, θobs is lower
than θ.
Finally, we summarize the estimation results over all markets in Table 3.8 using his-
tograms. For each market in our data, we estimate the strong-form rational expectation
model under the same price sensitivity and different price sensitivities. We obtain on
average 24% strategic consumers under the former and 17% under the latter. We also
find a sizable heterogeneity across markets, with standard deviations of 12% and 11%,
respectively. To investigate how strategic behavior is affected by the market character-
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Table 3.7: Allowing for Different Price Sensitivities between Myopic and Strategic Con-
sumers
perfect foresight strong-form rational weak-form rational
Market L
fraction 0.094 0.275 0.378
95% conf. int. [0.008, 0.182] [0.106, 0.391] [0.158, 0.548]
observed fraction 0.038 0.286 0.351
95% conf. int. [0.004, 0.097] [0.127, 0.435] [0.174, 0.511]
price
non-strategic (βn) -0.228 -0.229 -0.216
(0.032) (0.031) (0.030)
strategic (βs) -0.311 -0.187 -0.206
(0.335) (0.125) (0.066)
t -9.773 -10.332 -6.805
(3.609) (3.745) (3.243)
t2 2.169 2.354 1.778
(0.622) (0.640) (0.562)
t3 -0.105 -0.118 -0.091
(0.031) (0.031) (0.028)
last week 13.219 22.111 17.378
(5.077) (6.808) (6.358)
const 0.094 0.044 0.050
(0.062) (0.063) (0.074)
R-Square 0.3951 0.4076 0.4216
Market B
fraction 0.107 0.186 0.120
95% conf. int. [0.002, 0.201] [0.004, 0.367] [0.007, 0.250]
observed fraction 0.036 0.048 0.026
95% conf. int. [0.000, 0.093] [0.000, 0.142] [0.000, 0.105]
price
non-strategic (βn) -0.013 -0.024 -0.026
(0.032) (0.017) (0.016)
strategic (βs) -0.131 -0.201 -0.341
(0.364) (0.392) (0.510)
t 6.365 4.474 4.285
(2.135) (1.476) (1.354)
t2 -1.219 -0.986 -0.971
(0.335) (0.254) (0.241)
t3 0.085 0.077 0.077
(0.017) (0.013) (0.013)
last week 2.951 2.341 2.643
(4.969) (4.745) (4.705)
const 0.488 0.572 0.587
(0.102) (0.065) (0.059)
R-Square 0.5965 0.609 0.6108
91
Table 3.8: Fraction of Strategic Consumers over All Markets (strong-form rational ex-
pectation)
fraction same price different price
sensitivities sensitivities
average (std) 0.243 (0.126) 0.171 (0.112)
range [0.023, 0.514] [0.003, 0.567]
[5th percentile, 95th percentile] [0.049, 0.449] [0.022, 0.368]
# of significant estimates 51 57
total # of markets 111 111
histogram
istics, we regressed the fraction (the logistic transformation of the fraction) on market
characteristics such as level of competition, presence of low-cost carriers, distance and
origin demographics, destination types (business vs. leisure), distribution channel (on-
line vs. oﬄine), and market size. The results are displayed in Table 3.9. We find that
markets with shorter distance, higher income at the origin city, and smaller market size
tend to have more strategic consumers. Given the number of markets we have, our
ability to expand this analysis is limited.
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Table 3.9: Explaining Strategic Behavior Using Market Characteristics
same price elasticities different price elasticities
business market (avg % of full fare) 1.907 1.572
(1.358) (1.410)
HHI 1.099* 1.023
(0.597) (0.619)
low cost carrier market share -0.033 -0.170
(0.792) (0.822)
% of tickets distributed online 1.490* 1.443
(0.845) (0.877)
intl destination 0.356 0.500
(0.317) (0.329)
ln(distance) -0.407** -0.382**
(0.153) (0.159)
ln(origin population) 0.162 0.079
(0.137) (0.142)
ln(origin per capita income) 1.386* 1.652**
(0.724) (0.751)
ln(market size) -0.240** -0.227**
(0.109) (0.113)
constant -14.503** -16.333**
(7.132) (7.404)
# of obs (# of markets) 111 111
R-square 0.2372 0.2026
**:p-value< 0.05;*:p-value< 0.1
3.7.4 Time-Variant Fraction of Strategic Consumers
To investigate the arrival pattern of strategic consumers over booking time, we estimate
non-parametrically a time-variant vector of the fractions of strategic consumers. To
show the general pattern, we group the results by destination, since the trend of the
fraction over time for routes with the same destination are similar. Figure 3.1 shows
the fraction of strategic consumers over twelve booking periods before the final booking
period, estimated under strong-form rational expectation and with heterogeneity in price
sensitivities. As we see in the figure, the fraction of strategic consumers is higher at the
beginning of the booking horizon, that is, when risk and waiting costs are lower, or close
to departure, likely in search of last-minute deals. This pattern is less prominent in
popular markets such as Las Vegas (LAS) and Orlando (MCO), which is in line with
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Figure 3.1: Fraction of Strategic Consumers Varying with Booking Time (grouped by
destination)
the observation that last-minute deals are often offered in less-popular markets where
there is distressed inventory. Those consumers who arrive for the last-minute deals are
also flexible in their travel schedules, so they can decide to travel without much advance
planning if the price is low, or decide not to travel if the price is high.
3.8 Counterfactual Analysis
Now that we have robust evidence of strategic consumers, what are the revenue impli-
cations? What strategies should airlines take in response? We answer these questions
using counterfactual analysis. We focus on 1) the revenue impact of the presence of
strategic consumers, and 2) alternative pricing schemes to eliminate strategic waiting.
3.8.1 Revenue Impact of Strategic Consumers
The commonly held belief regarding strategic consumers is that they pose a threat to
firms’ revenues (see Anderson and Wilson 2003, Aviv and Pazgal 2008, Levin et al. 2009).
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Surprisingly, we find from our counterfactual analysis that this is not always true. As
a matter of fact, strategic waiting may sometimes benefit the seller, an effect that is
in line with the predictions by Su (2007) and Cho et al. (2008). Table 3.10 illustrates
this through two examples, based on 100 simulations using the most complex model
specification with heterogeneity in price sensitivity and time-variant fraction of strategic
consumers. The results hold across other model specifications as well. Under rational
expectations, each simulation involves computing a new equilibrium of consumer beliefs
and actual future prices. We ask the following question: how much will revenues change
if all consumers turn from myopic to strategic? To isolate the effect of price sensitivities
and the effect of being strategic, we let myopic consumers become strategic without
changing their original price sensitivities. As shown in Column 5, for business markets
such as Market B, revenue decreases by 0.40% to 1.01%, while in leisure markets such
as Market L, revenue increases by 0.22% to 1.39% (with small standard deviations in
both markets). This pattern is not specific to these two example markets but holds in
general, as we demonstrate shortly.
To explain the phenomenon, consider the two effects of strategic consumers: the
price-reduction effect and the demand-increasing effect. Strategic consumers drive down
prices, and as a result firms cannot charge high prices even to high-value customers. Yet
strategic consumers drive up demand in two ways. While the first is obvious — demand
is higher since prices are lower— the second is more subtle. Some low-value customers
will not buy at the price when they first arrive. The flexibility of being able to come
back in later periods offers them more purchasing chances, and they may end up buying.
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Which effect dominates depends on the heterogeneity in the composition of high-value
and low-value customers in the market. In business markets with proportionally more
high-value customers, the price-reduction effect dominates, whereas in leisure markets
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with proportionally more low-value customers, the demand-increasing effect dominates.
Table 3.10 illustrates the dominant effect for each market. The average price decreases
by 2.55% in business market B, similar to that (2.85%) in leisure market L assuming
perfect foresight (or 0.71% compared to 0.65% assuming rational expectation); however,
demand increases by only 1.59% in business market B, significantly smaller than the
4.36% increase in leisure market L (or 0.31% compared to 0.88% assuming rational
expectation).
We present summaries and histograms of the impacts of strategic consumers on rev-
enues across all markets in the left panel of Table 3.11. The ranges of revenue impacts
are [-2.7%, 1.0%] under perfect foresight and [-1.0%, 0.8%] under rational expectations,
as measured by the 5th and 95th percentiles. Since our data includes inventory classes,
we are able to compute the percentage of consumers who purchased full fares (inventory
class Y and B) as a measure of the extent to which the route is a business route. This
measure is negatively correlated with the revenue impact. The coefficient of correlation
is -0.366 and -0.216 under perfect foresight and rational expectations, respectively, sug-
gesting that the more “business” the route is, the more likely it is that the presence
of strategic consumers will have a negative effect on the revenues. Plus, we find no
significant effect of competition when regressing the revenue changes on various market
characteristics. Table 3.10 also shows that the effects of strategic consumers tend to be
more negative when they are more sophisticated in their prediction of future prices.
98
Table 3.11: Counterfactual Analysis Summarized across All Markets
revenue change (strategic - myopic) revenue gains from monotone price
perfect rational Exp. perfect rational exp.
foresight (strong-form) foresight (strong-form)
percentile
5% -2.7% -1.0% -1.4% -1.1%
50% -0.8% -0.1% 2.8% 3.1%
95% 1.0% 0.8% 9.2% 10.6%
mean -0.9% -0.1% 3.4% 3.6%
std 1.1% 0.5% 3.6% 3.5%
3.8.2 Non-Decreasing Price Commitment
One common approach to eliminate strategic waiting is to commit to fixed or non-
decreasing price paths, which is the practice often used by low-cost carriers. For exam-
ple, Southwest has much more transparent and simpler fare structures than the legacy
airlines, and their prices only go up as the departure date approaches, except for some
occasional temporary sales. The question is: would it be better for airlines to commit
to non-decreasing prices? Computing the optimal non-decreasing price path is itself a
question requiring separate analytical efforts beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we
examine the impact of a heuristic non-decreasing price scheme which adds a small twist
to the current pricing strategy. We take the current pricing strategy and use it to predict
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a candidate price point for the next period. We set the future price as the maximum of
this candidate price and the current price to guarantee that it is non-decreasing for all
airlines.
Column 6 in Table 3.10 shows that for business markets where strategic consumers
are undesirable, commitment to non-decreasing price ensures higher revenues — 2.9%
to 3.6% higher in this example. However, on the leisure markets, such commitment
would not be beneficial to the firms: revenues decrease by 2.4% to 3.7% in the example.
The impacts of committing to non-decreasing price schemes across different markets
are presented in the right panel of Table 3.11. The ranges of the revenue gains are
[-1.4%, 9.2%] under perfect foresight and [-1.1%, 10.6%] under rational expectations, as
measured by the 5th and 95th percentiles. The coefficient of correlation between the
measure of how business-like the market is and the revenue gains is positive, i.e., 0.249
and 0.220 under perfect foresight and rational expectations, respectively. This suggests
that the more business-like the route is, the more likely it is that airlines will benefit
from a non-decreasing price commitment.
3.9 Conclusions
We provide evidence of strategic consumers in the air-travel industry, and this evidence
is robust to various modeling assumptions. We obtain an estimate of 4.9% to 44.9%
proportion of strategic consumers on average across markets under rational expectation
assumption. Contrary to the predominant belief, our counterfactual analysis shows that
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strategic consumers do not always hurt revenues; the effect differs by market type. In
business markets, where a large proportion of consumers are relatively price-inelastic,
high value consumers, the presence of strategic consumers tends to drive down the total
revenue through lower prices. However, in leisure markets, the presence of strategic
consumers may boost market revenue by inducing higher demand. Therefore, commit-
ment to non-decreasing prices is more likely to be beneficial in business markets than in
leisure markets. The median revenue improvement on those markets that benefit from
a non-decreasing pricing strategy is 3.5%, with quartiles 1.8% and 5.6%.
Our results have important implications for both theory and practice. In many in-
dustries with significant price fluctuations over time, it is crucial to model demand with
consumers’ inter-temporal choices, and we propose a structural model for this purpose.
Failing to do so will result in suboptimal pricing or inventory decisions. Practically, our
counterfactual analysis provides important guidance to airline managers: improve de-
mand forecasts accounting for inter-temporal demand substitution, assess the impact of
strategic consumers, and decide in what circumstances it would be desirable to eliminate
strategic waiting and what is the potential benefit. Our approach can also be applied to
many other industries to help firms figure out whether their business is subject to the
presence of strategic consumers, and what action they should take in response.
Naturally, our study is not free of limitations, which offer many avenues for future
research. As we discussed earlier, we do not model details of inter-firm competition,
which merits a separate paper, although our simple controls for competition through
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Herfindahl Index were insignificant. Other most obvious restrictions and assumptions
are a single waiting time period (rather than multiple); a discrete, two-point distribu-
tion of strategic consumer behavior (rather than a continuous distribution); and weekly
aggregation of the data. We also conduct only limited counterfactual analysis: a sepa-
rate study might attempt to devise an entirely new optimization algorithm to maximize
revenues. These and other extensions will inevitably run into computational difficulties,
and resolving them will be part of the challenge.
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Chapter 4
Who are My Competitors? Let the
Customer Tell
4.1 Introduction
With whom you compete? Many competitive and fragmented industries, such as the
hotel industry, are challenged by this question. The US hotel and motel industry consists
of about 40,000 companies that operate about 50,000 properties. 50 largest companies
generate only 45 percent of total revenue. Take New York City for example, where more
than 500 hotels compete for business in the city and its vicinity. Besides the sheer number
of potential competitors, hotels also compete on multiple dimensions, both spatially (i.e.,
locations) and vertically (i.e., quality). Increasing adoption of internet as a convenient
and reliable searching and transaction channel has made the problem even more complex
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- it used to be the case that hotels competed mostly with other hotels in close proximity,
but now they can be competing with hotels located far away but offering appealing
services and rates.
Understanding competition structure in such a market has important theoretical and
practical implications. Theoretically, we do not understand quite well how firms in a
market like described above compete – researchers analyzed and measured competition
in markets with few competitors, e.g., duopoly and oligopoly markets, in which every
player competes with each other. However, there is currently no sufficient understanding
of competitive relationships in a networked market which includes both spacial and
vertical differentiation. Practically, monitoring competitors’ performance is a critical
part of hotels’ strategy development as well as daily operations. However, industry
professionals still mostly depend on rules of thumb to define competition set (Comp Set),
often with little support from data-driven analytical tools. Current prevalent practice to
define Comp Set in the hotel industry varies from looking across the street and identifying
properties that charge the same basic rates (appealing to the same price customer), to
weighing and scoring property attributes. For example, Smith Travel Research(STR)
advices hotels to look at the following attributes in determine competitive set: price,
location, restaurant and room service in hotel, meeting space, complimentary breakfast,
loyalty program, full-service amenities, and brand.
In this paper we propose a new customer-centric approach to study competition
structure. At the core of our methodology is the idea that hotels should see themselves
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as potential customers see them, because ultimately they are competing for customers’
demand. Thus, instead of asking themselves who they think they are competing with,
a better question to ask is “which hotels do customers consider as competitors?” The
ability to track consumer behavior online is making such approach possible because, as
noted by HotelNewsNow (a professional industry website launched by STR) “[According
to Forrester Research,] 90 percent of all travel-related purchasing decisions are made
online. So, despite our best efforts to define who we think our competition is, it’s really
customer perception that drives purchasing decisions22.” Analyzing consumer footprints
has been made possible by emerging availability of online search data. Which hotels did
consumers seriously consider before reaching the final decision? Which hotels did they
click to see details? Whose websites did they visit? Answers to these questions can
inform us about which hotels customers perceive as competitors. Note that clickstream
data has actually been around for about ten years or more (e.g., Fader and Moe 2004)
but both industry professionals and academic researchers are still finding ways to mine
gold out of this data. While most studies focus on using click streams to make better
prediction of conversion rate, we unveil in this paper another potential of clickstream
data — to analyze market competition structure.
In this paper, we develop a simple and intuitive approach to identify market com-
petition structure and conduct an empirical study using a combination of click-stream
data containing customer page views, search data containing displayed search results
even if not clicked, and hotel data from a major online travel agency (OTA). There
22“Who are my ‘true’ hotel competitors?” Trevor Stuart-Hill. HotelNewsNow.com
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are three key components in this paper. We first measure competition from customers’
point of view – which pairs of hotels are most likely to be compared by customers? We
identify one important caveat of measuring competition using online data. One must be
careful about the effect of travel agent’s ranking systems on measures of competition:
it is a well-documented fact that higher ranks are associated with higher click-through
rate (see Hoque and Loshe 1999 for example). To adjust for this possibility, we consider
several measures of co-location commonly used in word analysis in linguistic literature.
These measures control baseline probability of one hotel being clicked when calculating
the level of co-location (i.e., competition). Furthermore, we show that there can poten-
tially be an aggregation bias in these measures if we ignore heterogeneity in hotel ranks
and consumer tastes. To account for this effect, we imbed a Random Coefficient Choice
Model into the construction of co-location measures. This can only be done by com-
bining search data (which provides information on all displayed hotels) and clickstream
data (which provides information on clicked hotels).
Second, we calculate a proxy of how competition is perceived by hoteliers, where we
propose to measure the strength of the competitive relationship using price responsive-
ness (price matching). With these two measures, we are able to visualize local competi-
tion structure in the form of competition networks, build upon customers’ and hoteliers’
perspectives, respectively. Finally, we measure the extent of mismatch between the two
competition networks and we examine when mismatches are likely to occur. We find
that independent hotels and distant hotels are likely to be left out from competition
sets while branded hotels and hotels in close proximity are more likely to be included.
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Moreover, hotels tend to benchmark themselves with hotels that have lower star ratings,
lower price levels, lower ranks and higher customer reviews. By showing evidence of
Comp Set misperception among hoteliers, we illustrate how data-driven analytical ap-
proach can bring hotel managers closer to truly understand their competition and their
competitive positions.
We note that, although the paper uses hotel industry data, the methodology proposed
here can be easily applied to other products and services and the data required for this
type of co-location or co-occurrence analysis prevails in various online and even oﬄine
settings. Many merchandisers’ websites such as Verizon and Bestbuy allow consumers to
choose a couple of products (usually up to 4 or 5) and click “compare” to compare them
in detail. Many websites such as TripAdvisor and Amazon provide recommendations to
consumers by showing “customers who viewed this product also viewed...”. Consumer
generated contents on social media also allows to analyze which products tend to be men-
tioned together by customers (Netzer et al. 2012). Furthermore, emerging technologies
such as Shopper Tracker and Euclid are even able to track consumers’ physical actions
in retail stores or nearby. One commonality of all this data is that, unlike before when
we relied almost solely on transaction data to understand consumer choice and resulting
competition, now we are able to know not only consumers’ final choice but also which
options they have considered – in other words, which products/services competed for
each customer. Thus, the customer-centric approach and the view of networked compe-
tition structure that we propose in this paper are likely to benefit many other business
and future research as well. More questions can be examined under this framework,
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such as how competition network evolves dynamically over time, and how small local
perturbation may travel across a network through competitive links.
4.2 Literature
First and foremost, our customer-centric approach is part of the current trend of incor-
porating consumer-driven models into analysis of revenue management problems and
associated empirical applications. Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) introduces a general
discrete choice model to a single-leg Revenue Management problem in the airline indus-
try. A stream of studies have followed up on this line of research including Zhang and
Cooper (2006), Gallego et al. (2009), Farias et al. (2012), to name a few. Customer-
driven demand models have also been studied empirically in several revenue management
contexts. Vulcano et al. (2010) shows that, by accounting for customer choice behavior
in inventory control optimization, airline can improve their average revenue by 1–5%
from the current ESMR-b (Expected Marginal Seat Revenue, version b) policy. Li et al.
(2011) show that accounting for dynamic consumer choices can improve revenue in cer-
tain types of markets in the airline industry by 3-5%. In the realm of hotel revenue
management, Bodea et al. (2009) collect data from five U.S. properties of a major ho-
tel chain and illustrate how choice-based RM can be used with real data. Anderson
and Xie (2011) estimate a nested logit model on data from firms selling hotel rooms
through an opaque channel, and they optimize firms’ dynamic pricing decisions with
the knowledge of customer choice behavior. Using hotel transaction data supplemented
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with user-generated content from social media, Ghose et al. (2012) optimize hotel rank-
ing system on estimated customer valuation of hotel stays. Our approach is similar
in adopting a customer-centric perspective. Yet, we differ from the literature in three
significant aspects: 1) we adopt a different yet simple and intuitive approach to use cus-
tomer data; 2) the data we use is different from transaction data that is commonly used
in this literature. We use search and clickstream data – which allows us to track actions
leading to final decisions; 3) the research goal is to identify competition set for firms
to match pricing and benchmark performances on. This is a different type of revenue
management problem than the most commonly studied inventory control and dynamic
pricing problems.
What we propose is also an innovative approach towards understanding market com-
petition structure. While competition is an old and widely studied question in economics
and operations, most existing approaches fall into two categories in terms of methodol-
ogy. The first approach uses reduced form analysis to study the impact of competition
on firms’ performance using measures such as Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (Borenstein
and Rose. 1994), number of competitors (Olivares and Cachon 2009) or competitor en-
try and exit (Buell et al. 2011). The second approach applies structural estimation to
competitive models. See Berry et al. (1995) for an example of static competition model,
and Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012) for an example of a dynamic competition model. In
this approach, estimated cross-price elasticities can be understood as a measure of com-
petitiveness between firms. The majority of the literature assumes that every player in
the market competes with everyone else, and customers choose from all available prod-
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ucts. The relevant papers usually utilize firm-level performance data or customer-level
transaction data – neither stream attempts to understand which options were among the
real competing choices for each customer. In studying localized competition, there are
two general applications similar to our setting. One is fast food industry (Allon et al.
2011), and the other is gasoline industry. For example, Pinkse et al. (2002) show that
price competition among gasoline market is highly localized.
In adopting this customer-centric approach, we are able to visualize a networked
competition structure. This attempt is a part of the recent burgeoning efforts towards
modeling economic markets as networks. Similar to the idea raised in (Kranton and
Minehart 2001), we posit that firms do not compete with every other firm in a market,
or at least not as close competitors. Our work is also associated with a few other
streams of network-related literature. Customer associative networks have been used to
understand brand preferences and associations. A recent work by Netzer et al. (2012)
analyze how often consumers mention two products from online user-generated contents
to map out the competitive market structure. Our work is similar in its research goals
and methodology, but it is derived from a different type of data – data that measures
real actions, i.e., customer views of a product page, rather than data that measures
human memory and perceptions. In addition, we not only describe the customer-based
competition network, we also compare it against hotelier-based competition network to
examine degree of network mismatch. Network misalignment has also been studied in
other settings by Sosa et al. (2004), Gokpinar et al. (2010).
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In addition, our work also contributes to the empirical literature stemming from
the increasing availability of online clickstream data (e.g., Fader and Moe 2004, Fader
and Park 2004). Most papers in this stream focus on predicting conversion rate or
understanding customer browsing behavior and no studies we are aware of use the data
to understand market competition structure. We contribute by pointing out one other
important direction of how such data can be utilized.
4.3 Data and Industry Overview
4.3.1 Data
We combine three data sets associated with online search for hotels sponsored by a ma-
jor Online Travel Agency (OTA). The first data set, i.e., search and transaction data,
contains complete histories of all product searches at the sponsoring OTA’s website con-
ducted by approximately 4,000 cookie-based users in Manhattan, New York during the
first two weeks of October 2009. The travel dates actually span time period from Octo-
ber 2009 to September 2010. 90.4% requests are for dates within 3 months, and 96.2%
are for dates within 6 months. This data set includes information on what users searched
for, what searching criteria were specified, which hotels were returned in response (to-
gether with room availability, price and promotions, and reviews), which hotels visitors
looked at in details and which hotels were booked, if any. Search and transaction data
is tracked internally by the firm. The second data set, clickstream data, contains the
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complete clickstream history of all actions by the users identified in the search and trans-
actions data. The clickstream dataset contains usage of all web-properties belonging to
the sponsoring OTA for the same users included in the transaction data from January
2009 to October 2010. Each record describes a clickstream event such as viewing a
particular web page or submitting a form. This data set is tracked by a third-party
web analytics firm. The third dataset, hotel data, contains information associated with
hotels appearing on the OTA’s website, such as brand and chain name, ownership type,
room capacity, star level, etc.
In both search/transaction data and clickstream data, a unique ID is used to identify
each web user (cookie-based). The two data sets can be matched based on user ID and
event time. Note that certain information in these two data sets are overlapping – such
as a click of a hotel displayed in a search result. Meanwhile, each data set contains
its unique information. Since clickstream data only records clicks, hotels displayed but
not clicked are only recorded by search/transaction data, but not clickstream data. In
search/transaction data, we see everything that a user sees in a search result – hotels dis-
played and their associated prices, promotions and customer reviews. This hotel-specific
information is not recorded by clickstream data. However, since clickstream data records
all user actions, hotel page visits that are not resulting from standard search requests
are also recorded. A visit of a specific hotel’s webpage does not necessarily originate
from a direct search on the OTA’s website, but can also originate from external sources
and other internal pages of the OTA’s website. Examples of external sources include
search engines such as Google or Yahoo, other online booking sites, email promotions.
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Examples of internal pages include a page promoting recent deals, flight reservation or
car-rental pages, another hotel page linking to similar hotels in the same destination.
In fact, clicks which do not originate from direct search request on the OTA’s website
take up 69.8% of all page visits. In summary, access to clickstream data gives us a
more comprehensive view of the real consideration set of a customer. We could have
used the 20-month clickstream data to obtain Comp Sets. However, in order to match
it with the search/transaction data to control for the effect of the ranking system and
for heterogeneity in choice probabilities, we restrict our attention to the period in which
two data sets overlap, i.e., the first two weeks of October 2009.
In all, our data contains 3,514 users who searched for hotel stays in New York and
its vicinity during the first two weeks of October, 2009. This covers 309 hotels in
Manhattan23. In total, these hotels received 22,901 page views in our data, an equivalent
to an average of 76.8 page views per hotel. Naturally, hotels may be viewed multiple
times by the same user. 37.5% of users did not view any specific hotel page at all.
The rest viewed 10.4 pages on average per user, or 3.5 distinct hotels. We consolidate
multiple visits of the same hotel within a short period of time: we define restarting of a
new search session using an inaction period of 24 hours24. Prices, promotions, customer
reviews and hence ranks of the same hotel may change the next day – the same hotel
would essentially be a different hotel for a new search after 24 hours. Thus, for our
23New York City and its vicinity include 255 hotels outside Manhattan (e.g., New Jersey or Long
Island). We restrict our attention to hotels in Manhattan which receive, on average, six times more
page views than hotels outside of Manhattan. The unique geography of Manhattan makes it convenient
for our purposes or constructing competition networks without making them too sparse.
24We also use 8 hours and 48 hours as robustness checks and the results are very similar.
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purposes, within a search session multiple visits of a hotel page we count as only one
visit. Thus, we consolidate 22,901 page views to 7,764 distinct page visits.
In our data, we mainly observe price variations along two dimensions: 1) day-of-travel
and 2) day-of-observation. Variation along day-of-travel is mostly based on segmentation
of customer types. For example, business travelers tend to stay on weekdays, while
leisure travelers tend to stay on weekends. Hotels targeting different segments would
demonstrate different pricing strategies based on different days of the week. Variation
along day-of-observation is mostly du to inventory-based Revenue Management models
– how to price based on days in advance and how to dynamically change rates given
remaining room inventory. An important input for price changes along both dimensions
is how competitors adjust pries along the same two dimensions. Later, we will estimate
a pricing model to examine this aspect of the pricing behavior.
4.3.2 Hotel Industry Background
Hotel industry is characterized by intense competition with various types of branded
and non-branded properties competing for business. Hoteliers make continuous efforts
to differentiate their services from others, but they are still faced with fierce price com-
petition. As prices becoming more and more transparent with Internet search engines,
competition among hoteliers only increases. In our data, 309 hotels compete for business
in Manhattan, New York, offering 68,584 rooms. Among them, 59.2% are independent
properties, or 41.4% in terms of room capacity. Among the branded properties, a few
114
major chains (i.e., Hilton Worldwide, Choice, Marriott, IHG, Starwood) operate 77
properties under 32 brand names ranging from two to five stars. Competition exists not
only between chains but also within a chain – hotels in the same chain are typically
operated by different individuals or management firms.
Price Patterns. Hotel industry exhibits a great amount of price variation across
different properties, room types, customer types, days of stay and days of booking. Our
sample of 309 hotels in Manhattan offers an average room rate of $295 with a standard
deviation of $200. Part of the variation is manifested through frequent promotions
– a hotel is on promotion 41% of time in this period. Hotels sometimes reach full
capacity – 2.60% on average. The main drivers of the price variations are two-folds.
First, the industry has successfully adopted revenue management tools for the past 30
years. Further, rooms of a hotel are usually classified into several room types, which
are further grouped into a few (typically 10 to 12) rate bands together with customer
types for revenue management purposes. Rates typically start off from rack rates and
decrease from there. Discounted rates are characterized by percentage discounts off
rack rates. As room inventory depletes when the travel date approaches, the revenue
management system suggests opening or closing certain rate bands. At the same time,
revenue managers also retain rights to override the system when needs arise.
Such needs usually arise due to observing changes in competitors’ prices – an im-
portant input for pricing decisions in this industry. As a matter of fact, monitoring
competitors’ prices is part of everyday operations in the industry. “Call-Around” is a
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common practice in hotel industry, whereby “Hotels engage in regular communications,
typically by telephone with the hotels on their Call-Around Lists, two or three times
daily, to exchange with such hotels: (i) each hotel’s non-public current occupancy rate
(generally expressed as a percentage of hotel rooms occupied) and (ii) the standard rate
currently being charged for hotel rooms to be occupied that same day (generally ex-
pressed as the “BAR rate” or the “rack rate”, which would not include any available
discount rates)... Revenue Managers have the ability to manually override the preset
grid andor computer reservation system to adjust the applicable room rate.... In de-
termining whether to manually override the reservation system, the Regional Revenue
Manager may periodically consult various sources of information concerning competitor
rates, including publicly listed rates through internet sites or other market information25.
In addition to the “Call-Around” practice, hoteliers subscribe to automated tools to
monitor competitors’ rates closely, such as MarketVision, PriceTrack, and RateVIEW.
These tools help hoteliers shop rates and availabilities of hotels in their pre-specified
competition set (Cross et al. 2009). In addition, development of online search engines
exposes a wealth of readily-accessible price information not only to customers but also
to competitors.
Online booking channels. Transient business and leisure markets are captured
increasingly through online reservations. 81.5% consumers perform travel-related search,
and 70% visit a travel-related site prior to booking at the supplier’s website (Withiam
25An Agreement By and Among the Attorney General of the State of Connecticut, LQ Management
L.L.C., and La Quinta Franchising, L.L.C. March, 2010
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2011). OTAs currently capture a large market share of online hotel reservations. Based
on our analysis of a random sample of ComScore data in 2009, major OTAs — Ex-
pedia.com, Hotel.com, Hotwire, Priceline, Travelocity and Orbitz in descending order
of market share— contribute 43.7% of all online observations. This percentage is even
higher when we consider eye-visit market share. For example, 10.5% of customers who
booked hotels online made their reservations through Expedia.com, meanwhile, 29.8%
customers actually have visited Expedia.com before purchasing.
In an era of great price transparency enabled by online search engines, price matching
with wrong competitors has a potential to generate sizable revenue losses because any
pricing error is much more visible. Customers are quicker to punish misaligned prices
by booking away from hotels that have rates too high or pouncing on rates that are
below market. This new reality calls for an accurate definition of competition set and a
properly designed data-driven analytical approach, which will allow hotel managers to
benchmark prices with the right set of competitors and take proper actions to observed
price changes in the marketplace.
4.4 Methodology
In this section, we discuss the methodology used to measure competition intensity be-
tween pairs of hotels which further leads to construction of two competition networks
based on customers’ perspective and hoteliers’ perspective, respectively.
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4.4.1 Customer-Based Measure of Competition
To understand which hotel competes with which other hotels from customers’ perspec-
tive, we use click-stream data to analyze which hotels customers have compared be-
fore making the final choice, or, in other words, which hotels have competed for each
customer’s demand. The general idea is simple and intuitive: those hotels which are
compared frequently tend to be competing hotels. However, there are several caveats
associated with how we should define “frequent comparison”. If the number of compar-
isons between hotel A and B is higher than that of A and C, should B be considered
more of a competitor to A than C?
Illustrative example. Suppose there are three hotels A, B and C. 1, 000 customers
arrive and choose whether or not to click each hotel. Suppose that we observe hotel A
is clicked 200 times, B 500 times, and C 200 times. We also observe that A and B are
clicked together (i.e., compared) 100 times, while A and C are only compared 50 times.
Do we conclude that competition between A and B is more intense than that between
A and C? A simple 2 by 2 contingency table answers this question.
Table 4.1: Example: 2 by 2 Contingency Table
B B¯ total C C¯ total
A 100 100 200 A 50 150 200
A¯ 400 400 800 A¯ 150 650 800
total 500 500 1000 total 200 800 1000
Chi-square 0 Chi-square 3.9063
P-value 1 P-value 0.0481
Note: A represents A is clicked; A¯ represents A is not clicked.
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We observe that hotel A is compared with hotel B twice as often as it is compared to
Hotel C. However, the chi-square test shows that A and B are two independent events,
while A and C have a significantly positive dependence. If customers click on hotels
randomly, we expect to observe a frequency of 100 comparisons of A and B. However,
we expect to see only 40 comparisons of A and C, which is smaller than what we actually
observe, i.e., 50 comparisons.
From this simple example it is clear that we need to account for probability of
each hotel being clicked when considering the extent to which two hotels compete for
demand. That is, we need to control for popularity of each hotel. Even if clicking a
particular hotel is completely independent from clicking other hotels, a popular hotel
will be compared more often with others simply because it receives more clicks. This is
especially important when we consider potential effects of online ranking systems: it is
a well-known fact that higher-ranked options receive more clicks in general. In our data,
probability of clicking a hotel descends almost monotonically as one moves down along
the OTA suggested ranks displayed on the page, and the top 10 hotels receive about
half (47.7%) of all click-throughs (see Figure 4.1). Since higher-ranked hotels tend to
receive more clicks, if we do not adjust for probability of hotel being clicked, we would
come to a biased conclusion that there is more competition among top-ranked hotels
than among lower-ranked hotels.
Measures of co-location. To test whether including hotel A and B into the same
consideration set is a random event, we adopt four co-location measures that are widely
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Figure 4.1: Histogram of Rank conditional on Clicking
used in both in the linguistic literature (see Manning and Schutze 1999 for a general
discussion) and in the data-mining literature. The null hypothesis is that including hotel
A in the consideration set is independent from including hotel B in the consideration set,
i.e., P (AB) = P (A)P (B). The four measures are 1) t statistics, 2) Chi-Square statistics
, 3) Pointwise Mutual Information (PMI, also called “lift” in data-ming literature), and
4) and an adjusted version of PMI — normalized PMI.
T-test uses normal approximation for the number of successes of a series of Bernoulli
trials with probability p = P (A)P (B) under the null hypothesis. Chi-Square test imple-
ments the chi-square test for independence for the 2 by 2 contingency table as in Table
4.1. Unlike t-test, Chi-Square test does not rely on the normal approximation to the
Binomial distribution.
Pointwise Mutual Information (proposed by Church and Hanks 1990) is defined as
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follows,
log
( P (AB)
P (A)P (B)
)
. (4.1)
PMI is simply the ratio of A and B’s actual joint probability over the expected joint
probability if they were independent events. PMI being 0 means that the two events
are independent. A positive PMI means that occurrence of the two events is positively
correlated. One known limitation of this measure, however, is that PMI is particularly
sensitive to low frequency events (even though all co-location measures are sensitive to
low frequency data to some extent). To see why, assume perfect dependence between
clicking two hotels A and B so we have
log
( P (AB)
P (A)P (B)
)
= log
( 1
P (B)
)
. (4.2)
A low probability of P (B) indicates a large PMI value in this case. To mitigate its
impact, we introduce another measure – normalized PMI defined as follows (Bouma
2007),
log
( P (AB)
P (A)P (B)
)
/− log(P (AB)). (4.3)
This measure is proposed to overcome two shortcomings of PMI: 1) sensitivity to low-
frequency data; 2) lack of a fixed upper-bound. Normalized PMI is essentially a PMI
scaled by joint probability, which gives lower weights to low frequency events. When
two events are completely dependent, the above measure equals its upper bound 1.
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Alternative measures of co-location.
Consider the following example of clicking probabilities which are dependent on ranks.
Suppose clicking hotel A, B, C are independent events. The probability of one hotel being
clicked is completely determined by its rank – 0.7 if ranked first, 0.5 if ranked second,
and 0.3 if ranked last. Also suppose all six orders appear with equal probabilities.
Table 4.2: Example: Aggregation Bias
rank order 1 order 2 order 3 order 4 order 5 order 6 Pr(click)
1 A A B B C C 0.7
2 B C A C A B 0.5
3 C B C A B A 0.3
In this example, we can calculate the following probabilities:
P (AB) =
1
6
(0.35 + 0.21 + 0.35 + 0.21 + 0.15 + 0.15) = 0.237,
P (A) = P (B) =
1
3
(0.7 + 0.5 + 0.3) = 0.5,
P (AB) 6= P (A)P (B).
If the probability of an event occurring varies with different contexts (such as different
orders of results), aggregating probabilities may induce bias. The following equation
shows why it is the case in general. Under null hypothesis of independence,
P (AB) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Pi(AB) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Pi(A)Pi(B)
6= ( 1
N
N∑
i=1
Pi(A))(
1
N
N∑
i=1
Pi(B)) = P (A)P (B).
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In different types of searches and on a different observation day, the same hotel
may appear at different positions in the search result. If we do not account for this
possibility, we will have a biased measure of co-location. Note that, this aggregation
bias can also be induced through other channels. For instance, the choice of viewing
a hotel is also dependent on prices, promotions and customer reviews, which are also
context-dependent.
Suppose we know the clicking probability Pi(A), Pi(B), i = 1, ..., n, it is then straight-
forward to adjust for this potential aggregation bias. Simply substitute P (A)P (B) by
1
N
∑N
i=1 Pi(A)Pi(B). A special note to validity of using t-statistics in this case. Under
null hypothesis of independence, we expect to observe a sequence of independent but
non-identical Bernoulli trials with succuss probabilities: pi = Pi(A)Pi(B), i = 1, ..., N .
Total number of successes then follows a Poisson Binomial Distribution, which can also
be approximated by a Normal distribution with mean
∑
i pi and variance
∑
i pi(1− pi).
Thus, we can still use t-test of independence. Consequently, P (AB) can be approximated
by a normal distribution with mean 1
N
∑
i pi and variance
1
N2
∑
i pi(1−pi). The remain-
ing question is: in t-statistics, can we still use P (AB)(1−P (AB))
N
as estimates of the sample
variance? Even if null hypothesis holds, in general, P (AB)(1−P (AB)
N
6= 1
N2
∑
i pi(1 − pi).
However, when pi’s are small, we have 1 − pi ≈ 1. Then, we have P (AB)(1−P (AB))N ≈
P (AB)
N
= 1
N2
∑
i pi ≈ 1N2
∑
i pi(1− pi).
How to obtain estimates of Pi(A), Pi(B), i = 1, ..., N? These probabilities can be
estimated through a logistic regression. For each displayed hotel, a consumer decides
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to either click or not click26, and this action is a function of both time-variant and
time-invariant characteristics of the displayed hotel: rank, room rate, promotion status,
customer review, star rating and location. Other information such as amenities, trans-
portation, complementary services do not affect the decision of clicking as they are not
part of customers’ information set yet.
One shortcoming using logistic regression is its underlying assumption of independent
error terms and the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property. In reality,
a consumer’s clicking decision can be correlated across hotels. To account for this het-
erogeneity in consumers’ tastes and to overcome the IIA problem, we use the Random
Coefficient Logit (or Mixed Logit) model (Train 2003). We predict clicking probability
Pi(A), Pi(B), i = 1, ..., N based on this model while allowing for random coefficients.
uijk = βiXjk + ijk, βi ∼ N(β0,Σ),
uijk = β0Xjk + ξijk,where ξijk = (βi − β0)Xjk + ijk,
where i represents an individual, j represents an alternative, i.e., a hotel, and k represents
a search occasion. An example of a search occasion is a search request made on October
1, 2010 for a two-night stay in New York City starting from November 1, 2010. Xjk
represents characteristics of hotel j at search occasion k. For example, $295 per night
were quoted for the above request. βi is a vector of random coefficients. ijk are i.i.d.
26Suppose that the total number of hotels displayed is exogenously given. In reality, it is chosen
endogenously, as consumers do choose to wether or not to continue on to the next page or result.
Should they choose to continue, more hotels will be displayed to them. However, in our data, almost
all customers (96.4%) stayed on the first page of results and did not scroll down.
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shocks across consumers, hotels and search occasions. This means that even though,
at the person level, clicking of hotels A and B are completely independent as iAk and
iBk are independent, the aggregate choice of the two hotels can be dependent due to
heterogeneity in customers’ tastes, that is, ξiAk and ξiBk are correlated within the same
person. We want to adjust for this possibility, and verify if the data and the proposed
methodology capture additional patterns of competition in addition to what is captured
by the conventional model.
4.4.2 Hotelier-Based Measure of Competition
Competitor’s price is a key component when a hotel determines its own price. Each
property has a list of hotels which they consider as competitors. Traditionally, they
use such a list in Call-Around practice to solicit information on standard rates and
occupancy rate from competitors. Now with proliferation of online booking tools, prices
become even more transparent. Revenue managers no longer need to call several times a
day to learn about competitors’ prices and availability, it is just a click away. Any change
in a hotel’s price such as newly launched promotions, or changes in room availability,
can be immediately spotted and may invoke price changes from competitors should they
decide to react. As a result of price matching practice, prices of competing hotels will
be highly correlated, and we will use this as basis to identify competitors from hoteliers’
point-of-view.
Based on theories of product differentiation, if firms are able to differentiate their
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services or products through dimensions such as quality or location, they do not need
to engage in fierce price competition. Thus, a lack of price differentiation among firms
indicates a lack of differentiation along other aspects, or in other words, firms perceive
themselves offering very similar products. In the hotel industry in particular, 70% of
variations in prices, measured usually by Average Daily Rate (ADR), can be explained
by a hedonic model of product characteristics (e.g., Thrane 2007), similar to housing
markets. This is to say, price levels in this industry are a symbol of how similar hoteliers
think their services are. Kim and Canina (2009) exploit ADR clustering patterns to
identify hotel competition set.
We use correlation of two price series {pjk, j = A,B, k = 1, 2, ..., K} to capture
competitiveness between hotel A and B from hoteliers’ perspectives. j corresponds to
hotels, and k corresponds to search occasions. For example, Hotel A may charge $299
per night for a two-night stay request made on a particular date for a particular travel
starting date, with or without specifications on the number of adults, number of children
and type of room. Hotel B may charge $289 for the exact same request. Note that the
availability of search data allows us to obtain price correlation down to the level of
search requests, while most other analysis using hotel prices are based on aggregated
ADR. This benefit also comes with a cost. Not all hotels are seen by a customer, due to
his particular specifications of the travel request or his inaction beyond the first page of
results. As a consequence, we have only a few observations for some hotel pairs if they
are seldom shown in the same search. However, the pairs for which we do not have much
data are also those pairs that charge quite different rates and hence are not likely to be
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close competitors. For hotels that charge competitive rates, we would have thousands
of price pairs to calculate price correlation. Further, as price quotes are search-specific
and not customer-specific, we can group the same search made by multiple customers
with adjacent time, such as within the same searching day, to obtain more observations
of price pairs.
Alternative Measures of Price Matching.
To better understand how hotels match prices, we decompose price correlation into two
components according to the following pricing model:
pjk = αj + βjXjk + jk, (4.4)
αj is a hotel-specific intercept which represents the average level of price of hotel j. It
includes how a hotel sets prices based on its static characteristics such as location, star
rating, and brand. βj estimates a hotel-specific factor of how hotels price characteristics
of each travel request, such as length of stay, day-of-week of travel dates, days of advanced
purchase, number of adults and children etc. We suspect that price matching mostly
happens along two dimensions – travel dates and booking dates, as they are the main
variations of different travel requests and two most important identifiers of travel types
(i.e., business vs. leisure). Comparison of how similar βj’s are will inform us about
the level of price matching between hotel pairs. The error component jk represents
idiosyncratic shocks to prices, such as unpredicted changes in demand and unpredicted
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adjustments in competitors’ prices. Applying the above model to each hotel, we are able
to obtain a predicted price series {pˆjk, k = 1, 2, ..., K} and residual price series {pjk −
pˆjk, k = 1, 2, ..., K}. Similar to correlation of original price series, we obtain correlations
of predicted price series and residual price series for each hotel pair. Correlation of
predicted prices is mainly based on price matching along travel dates and booking dates.
Correlation of price residuals is mostly based on price matching of idiosyncratic price
changes and common demand shocks.
One concern of using price correlation as a measure of price matching is that two
price series can go in parallel with each other, but with a large discrepancy (for example,
one around $100 and the other around $500). This means that it is probably the overall
demand shock that is driving the correlation rather than the hotel trying to match prices.
To address this concern, we define another measure — Average Price Difference between
two price series 1
K
∑K
k=1 |p1k − p2k|. Under perfect price matching, the measure should
be zero. A larger value means less price matching and less competition.
4.5 Empirical Results
4.5.1 Consumer-based Competition Measure
We compare four measures of consumer-based competition — t-statistics, Chi-Square
statistics, PMI, NPMI, and then select the most appropriate for our application. As
shown in many other cases of co-location analysis, PMI is particularly sensitive to low-
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frequency data. Normalized PMI is proposed to address this issue. We observe that
Normalized PMI indeed adjusts this sensitivity, but only to a certain extent, as shown
in Table 4.3 listed in descending order of NPMI. Take first and forth rows of Table 4.3,
for example, both PMI and NPMI favor the low-frequency event of hotel “John Street
Suites” which has been clicked only once during our period of study but was compared
with “Hotel Belleclaire” at that time. Chi-Square statistic further adjusts sensitivity
to low-frequency data. Within the above example, Chi-Square favors “Grand Union”
with 36 clicks and 10 comparisons over the small-probability event of clicking “John
Street Suites”. However, comparing the first row and the twelfth row, Chi-Square favors
the low frequency event in this case. T-statistic is the least sensitive to low-frequency
data among all four measures. It is also one of the three measures (PMI, NPMI, and t-
statistics) that can be consistently implemented when we account for heterogeneity and
observe independent but non-identical Bernoulli trials. Due to these reasons, we focus
on t-statistics as our main measure of competition27. The shortcoming of t-statistics is
its normal approximation for Binomial distribution. A commonly applied rule of thumb
is to restrict attention to cases in which Np >= 5. We note that, when we only choose
t-statistics greater than 1.96 (i.e., p − value = 0.05), this number is greater than or
equal to 4 for all selected pairs of hotels and 97.0% of these pairs have greater than 5
comparisons.
27We also applied NPMI with a cut-off value where the event has to occur at least 3 times, suggested
by (Manning and Schutze 1999). Results are consistent.
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Based on t-statistics, the top 10 and bottom 10 pairs of competitors are listed in
Table 4.4. On the top of this list is Park Central New York Hotel which has been viewed
164 times, and Paramount Hotel Times Square New York which has been viewed 93
times, and the pair have been compared 21 times. At the bottom of the list is Empire
Hotel and Doubletree Guest Suites Times Square NYC. Each of them has been viewed
multiple times (70 and 191, respectively). However, they are compared only once28.
Using a cut-off value of 1.96 of t-statistic, we build an (undirected) competition
network of Manhattan hotels in Figure 4.2. As we expected, there is a strong clustering
pattern within the same star level. Occasionally, hotels also compete with hotels of
adjacent star levels. The degree distribution of the network has a mean of 8.42, median
of 6.00, and minimum of 1 and maximum of 36. That is on average, a hotel has 6 to 8
competitors, consistent with the average size of Benchmark Comp Set provided directly
by 2,833 hotels to Hotel Compete29. The average geodesic distance in this graph is 2.93,
with a maximum (diameter) of 8. That is, on average, a hotel can be linked to another
hotel through three steps of competitive relationship, or two competitors in between.
This small degree of separation can have interesting implications – it means that some
kind of local shock to a particular hotel (such as promotions resulted from demand or
supply shocks) may spread quickly to other parts of the network through price matching.
One caveat of using a universal cut-off is that some hotels with only weak competition
28For the purpose of illustration, we only list those pairs of hotels which were compared at least once.
There are many other pairs which have no comparisons at all.
29“Hotel Comp Set Analysis – Untapped Opportunity #1: Market Dynamics.” Hotel Compete. May
16, 2012.
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Figure 4.2: Visualize Customer-based Competition Network (t-stat> 1.96)
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links (usually those which do not appear often and also these that are not compared often
with others) may be left out from this graph. Of course, as we move down the ladder of
t-statistics and choose a lower cut-off value we would visualize more competitive links.
4.5.2 Evidence of Price Matching
To illustrate price matching among competitive hotels, we compare pricing strategies
among hotels. We take the top two pairs of competitive hotels from Table 4.4, for
example. The basic information for each hotel is listed in the table below:
Hotel Name Star Brand Location # Room
Pair1 Park Central New York Hotel 3.5 Independent Midtown 935
Paramount Hotel Times Square NY 3 Independent Times Square 567
Pair2 Sheraton New York Hotel And Towers 3.5 Starwood Sheraton Midtown 1750
The Manhattan at Times Square Hotel 3 Starwood other brand Midtown 665
Following the pricing model described in Equation 4.4, we analyze pricing strategy
of each hotel separately, the results of which are shown in Table 4.5. Note that the
estimated coefficients are very similar within each pair, but quite different across pairs.
For example, days in advance have positive coefficients for both hotels in Pair 1 and
negative coefficients for both hotels in Pair 2. The two hotels from Pair 1 increase prices
linearly from Sunday to Saturday, with the highest room rate on Saturday-night stay.
Hotels of Pair 2 tend to charge the highest rate on Friday night, with the second highest
being Wednesday night. These patterns can be seen clearly in Figures 4.3 and 4.4. It is
obvious that Park Central and Paramount adopt similar pricing strategies, and Sheraton
and Manhattan adopt similar pricing strategies. This evidence suggests that hoteliers
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Table 4.5: Price Matching Patterns
Park Central Paramount Hotel
New York Hotel Times Square New York
days in advance 0.59*** (0.14) 1.89*** (0.14)
days in advance squared -0.02*** (0.00) -0.02*** (0.00)
length of stay -9.42*** (0.64) -10.88*** (0.63)
Mon 7.82 (10.68) -19.23 (9.60)
Tue 62.86*** (9.35) 50.82*** (8.43)
Wed 91.00*** (8.73) 68.20*** (7.72)
Thu 106.12*** (8.36) 79.57*** (7.51)
Fri 115.73*** (7.91) 84.98*** (7.04)
Sat 118.52*** (9.56) 100.94*** (10.16)
Christmas/New Year 95.22*** (5.18) 43.67*** (4.89)
# adults per room 15.40*** (1.96) 49.16*** (1.86)
# children per room 29.43*** (3.27) 87.59*** (3.01)
const 225.61*** (7.99) 161.23*** (7.06)
Adj R sq 0.3267 0.4781
# obs 3945 3690
Sheraton New York The Manhattan at
Hotel And Towers Times Square Hotel
days in advance -0.45*** (0.13) -0.34*** (0.13)
days in advance squared -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00)
length of stay -4.85*** (0.69) -6.30*** (0.62)
Mon 5.27 (9.11) -1.94 (10.13)
Tue 30.75*** (8.04) 17.16** (8.64)
Wed 63.09*** (7.53) 53.59*** (8.06)
Thu 55.50*** (7.60) 46.85*** (8.07)
Fri 88.32*** (6.75) 83.51*** (7.45)
Sat 51.53*** (7.01) 45.65*** (7.68)
Christmas/New Year 3.82 (6.39) -11.06* (6.17)
# adults per room 4.98*** (1.88) 1.63 (2.05)
# children per room 8.82*** (3.40) 2.95 (5.00)
const 308.76*** (6.93) 313.28 (7.69)
Adj R sq 0.3888 0.3691
# obs 3231 3306
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match prices with their competitors, which supports our approach of using similarity in
prices to represent who hotel managers identify as their close competitors.
Figure 4.3: Price Matching across Day of
Week
Figure 4.4: Price Matching across Days in
Advance
Table 4.6 lists 4 measures of price matching for top 10 and bottom 10 pairs displayed
in Table 4.4. Generally, higher t-statistics are associated with higher correlation scores
and lower average price difference, even though the order might not be exactly the
same. The association is even stronger once we combine multiple measures to determine
competitiveness.
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4.5.3 Network Mismatch
After obtaining both consumer-based and hotelier-based competition measures, we are
ready to evaluate the mismatch of the two networks. As some hotels, especially star 1
and 2 hotels, do not appear quite often to have a robust measure of price correlation,
we restrict our attention to the sub-network of hotels with 3 stars or higher, which gives
us around 193 hotels. There is not a sufficient number of comparisons or price pairs
for some pairs of hotels (which most likely are not strong competitors in any way). We
further restrict our attention to those pairs where we have sufficient comparisons for
from the consumer data (i.e., at least 3 comparisons) and sufficient price pairs (i.e, at
least 30 price pairs). In this way, our networks are finally constructed on 89 hotels, which
actually represent 64.1% of the total number of rooms offered collectively by hotels with
a minimum star level of three.
We note that, when it comes to price matching, different hotels match prices on
different levels. Some hotels tend to have higher correlation with most other hotels, while
some other hotels have a lower price correlation with others in general. For example,
5-star hotels usually do not engage in much price competition. Due to this reason, using
a universal cut-off of price correlation may seem unfair to different hotels. Instead, we
decide to identify up to top 5 competitors for each hotel based on price correlations of
this hotel with all other hotels. Similar logic also applies to consumer-based network.
We choose up to top 5 hotels30 based on t-statistics as competitors of the focal hotel.
30Top 5 is a conservative choice as the average number of competitors of a hotel is usually 6 to 8. We
also tried top 10 competitors, and the results are similar.
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Figure 4.5: Top 5 Competitors Networks of Hotels with 3 Stars and Up
In this way, we derive two directed networks – top 5 competitors’ networks as shown in
Figure 4.5. Directed links in this figure point from a focal hotel to its competitors.
First, we make a note on the average amount of overlap between the two networks.
The amount of mismatch is visualized in Figure 4.6, and the numbers are shown in Table
4.7. Among 386 competitors identified by customer-based measures, 191 or 49.5% are
also competitors recognized by hoteliers. 160 of the 386 competitive links in hotelier-
based competition network are also reciprocal – that is, both hotels consider each other
among top 5 competitors. A similar number of links, i.e., 172, are reciprocal in customer-
based competition network. To further examine when mismatch is likely to occur, we
run regressions of true competitors being leftout or wrong competitors being included
on characteristics of hotels relative to the hotel in consideration.
Results of when mismatch is likely to occur are shown in Table 4.8. Coefficients in
Column 1 are marginal effects obtained from a logit model for predicting a competitor
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Figure 4.6: Network Mismatch
Table 4.7: Network Overlap and Mismatch among Hotels with 3 Stars and Up
hotelier-based
competitors
customer-based competitors 0 1 Total
0 859 195 1,054
1 195 191 386
Total 1,054 386 1,440
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being left out from competition set by hoteliers conditional on customers consider it as
a competitor. Coefficients in Column 2 are marginal effects obtained from a logit model
for predicting a competitor being included in competition set by hoteliers conditional on
it is not a competitor from customer perspective. We find that independent hotels are
likely to be leftout when hoteliers define their competition set, and branded hotels are
often included in the competition set while they should not be. Reading from Column 1
and 2, an independent hotel has a 20% higher chance being left out of competition set
than a branded hotel, and a branded hotel has a 10.5% higher chance of being included
in the competition set while it should not. In forming their competition set, hoteliers
also have a bias for hotels in the same district31. A hotel in a different district has a
10.9% higher chance of being left out from competition set32. Hotels with lower traveler
reviews are likely to be left out from competition set as well. It can be that hotels set
up a high benchmark for themselves or just think they are as good as those better rated
ones. Finally, we also notice that hotels tend to benchmark themselves with other hotels
with lower star ratings, lower price levels and lower ranks.
31Districts are defined according to the OTA’s definition as follows: Broadway – Times Square, Upper
East Side, Upper West Side, Financial District / Downtown, Grand Central, Lower, Lower East Side,
Lower West Side, Mid-town East, Mid-town West, North Manhattan, Uptown East.
32To test the location effect, we also used distance rather than the same district indicator. The signs
are exactly the same but sometimes not statistically significant.
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To check the robustness of mismatch patterns discovered above, we use alternative
measures of customer-based and hotelier-based competition. For customer-based com-
petition, we adjust aggregation bias using Logit and Mix Logit model. The estimation
results of the two logit models are displayed in Table 4.9. Mismatch patterns based on
t-statistics resulting from Mix Logit model are shown in the third and forth columns of
Table 4.7. For hotelier-based competition measure, we present results based on the aver-
age price difference in columns 5 and 6. We first note that the two alternative measures
yield similar levels of overall overlapping between two networks. The amounts of overlap
are 45.1% and 48.4% respectively, as compared to 49.5% previously. Second, these re-
sults confirm the findings with regard to when mismatch is likely to occur, though with
minor changes in certain significance levels.
Table 4.9: Choice Models Predicting Probability of Clicking
Logit Mixed Logit
Mean S.D.
rank -0.045*** (0.004) -0.063*** (0.004) 0.045*** (0.003)
total # of displayed hotels -0.073*** (0.004) -0.086*** (0.005) 0.016*** (0.002)
no available room -0.180*** (0.022) -0.549*** (0.130) 0.039 (0.245)
price -0.122 (0.106) -0.244*** (0.028) 0.051** (0.023)
promotion 0.530*** (0.049) 0.392*** (0.065) 0.892*** (0.065)
star rating 0.066** (0.028) -0.019 (0.043) 0.006 (0.013)
customer review -0.013 (0.039) 0.061** (0.029) 0.006 (0.011)
sub-market dummies
financial -0.092 (0.592) -0.084 (0.621) 0.347 (0.332)
central -0.709 (0.609) -1.505 (0.957) 1.610** (0.699)
lower -0.349 (0.608) -0.330 (0.651) 0.290 (0.623)
lowereast -0.061 (0.621) -0.117 (0.673) 0.440 (0.675)
lowerwest -0.210 (0.575) -0.160 (0.600) 0.411* (0.234)
mideast -0.003 (0.573) 0.056 (0.595) 0.302* (0.163)
midwest -0.019 (0.573) 0.062 (0.594) 0.139 (0.121)
timessquare 0.021 (0.573) 0.082 (0.596) 0.312** (0.159)
uppereast -0.301 (0.584) -0.354 (0.621) 0.584* (0.351)
upperwest 0.206 (0.578) 0.346 (0.600) 0.191 (0.352)
uptowneast 1.357 (0.986) 1.221 (1.196) 0.886 (1.559)
const -0.197 (0.588) 0.317 (0.610) 0.011 (0.046)
Log likelihood -7800.5209 -7542.7694
# obs 32223 32223
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4.6 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose methodology to identify competition sets from customers’
perspective. Our main contributions are three-folds: 1) We develop a customer-centric,
data-driven approach to tackle the question that challenges many businesses – who
are we really competing with? 2) We provide a network view to understand market
competition structure; 3) We point out one important potential of using online data –
to study competition among firms. We apply this methodology to hotel industry, using
a combination of search, clickstream and hotel data from a major OTA. Using this data,
we also identify price matching behavior among hoteliers, and use it as a basis to develop
competition sets from hoteliers’ perspective. We contrast the two competition networks
on a subset of hotels in Manhattan. We find 50% mismatch of the two competition sets.
We find that usually independent and distant hotels which are left out from competition
sets. Meanwhile, hotels have a tendency to compare themselves to other hotels with
lower star ratings, lower price levels, lower ranks and higher customers reviews.
A shortcoming with our application is that the data is from a single OTA. That is,
we do not observe customers actions on other websites, such as other OTAs or hotels’
own websites. Considering the amount of overlap of listed hotels among multiple OTA
sites (especially in the major destination that we study in this paper – Manhattan), and
the fact that 70% of the customers visit a travel-related site before booking on supplier’s
own website, the concern is mitigated. Certainly, a more comprehensive dataset would
allow for more precise estimation.
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Our approach can easily be applied to many other industries. We note that there
exist various formats of data which can support the type of analysis that we conduct
in this paper. Some examples of this type of data are: “customers who viewed this
product also viewed ...”, product comparison data tracked by sites providing “compare”
options for online shoppers, and even oﬄine technologies tracking customer movements
in supermarkets. We would like to highlight that the business analytics opportunity of
using this type of data is vast and promising.
We see this study as opening up many future research avenues on network competi-
tion as well. In the competition network of Manhattan hotels, we find that, on average,
a hotel has 6 to 8 close competitors, and the average number of steps needed to reach
from one hotel to another is 3. The small degree of separation potentially means that
a small perturbation, such as a price promotion, may quickly spread to other parts of
the market through competitive links. This would be an interesting phenomenon to
study. Additionally, competition network is an endogenous network. How does it form
in the market-place, and how do firms choose to position themselves in such a network
is also an interesting question to answer. Other topics like dynamic evolution of compe-
tition network and overlap of competition network with other networks are also worth
addressing.
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Chapter 5
Appendices
5.1 Partnering with Competitors — An Empirical
Analysis of Airline Alliances and Multimarket
Competition
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5.2 Are Consumers Strategic? Structural Estima-
tion from the Air-Travel Industry
Estimation under Fixed-Effect and Serial Correlation
To estimate the model with fixed effects and serial correlation in the baseline demand,
we apply the following transformation. For simplicity of illustration, in the following
discussion we assume a constant fraction of strategic consumers and the same price
sensitivity for both non-strategic and strategic consumers. Similar logic can easily be
applied to more complicated models. In the demand model, let Xmt represent market-
departure date characteristics Xm, polynomials of booking time t and the constant
dmt = (1− θzmt)
(− βpmt +Xmtδ + εmt)+ θzm,t−1(− βpmt +Xm,t−1δ + εm,t−1)
εmt = µm + mt,
mt = ρm,t−1 + νmt.
The demand model can also be written as
dmt = dˆmt + (1− θzmt)νmt,
dˆmt = (1− θzmt)
(− βpmt +Xmtδ + ρεm,t−1)+ θzm,t−1(− βpmt +Xm,t−1δ + εm,t−1)
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Note that previously realized demand shock εm,t−1 can be used to predict demand dˆmt
once it is estimated from the previously realized demand dm,t−1.
To obtain consistent estimates through non-linear least square, all we need is the
following assumption,
E
[
(1− θzmt)νmt|X, p
]
= 0,
which is satisfied by our assumption that E
[
νmt|X, p
]
= 0.
Our goal is to find the parameter set (θ, β, ρ, δ) that minimizes the sum of squares∑
(dmt − dˆmt)2 =
∑
(1− θzmt)2νˆ2mt, while allowing for possible price endogeneity. Price
pmt can be correlated with µm. Meanwhile, price pmt can also be correlated with εmt
through correlation with εm,t−1.
To estimate the model, the general idea is to transform the nonlinear problem to a
linear problem — the traditional panel data problem with fixed effect and serial corre-
lation. First, move price to the left-hand side in the demand model, and the right-hand
side can be written as the the multiplication of a transformation matrix Z(θ) and a
column vector
dmt + (1− θzmt + θzm,t−1)βpmt = (1− θzmt)
(
Xmtδ + µm + mt
)
+θzm,t−1
(
Xm,t−1δ + µm + m,t−1
)
,
d+ β(1− θz + θlagz)p = Z(θ)(Xδ + µ+ ),
Z−1(θ)
(
d+ β(1− θz + θlagz)p) = Xδ + µ+ .
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where lagz is z lagged by one period of time. Let d˜mt(θ, β) denote the left-hand side.
Since
d˜mt(θ, β) = Xmtδ + µm + mt = Xmtδ + µm + ρm,t−1 + νmt,
d˜m,t−1(θ, β) = Xm,t−1δ + µm + m,t−1.
Take partial difference to remove serial correlation,
d˜mt(θ, β)− ρd˜m,t−1(θ, β) = (Xmt − ρXm,t−1)δ + (1− ρ)µm + νmt, (5.1)
˜˜dmt(θ, β, ρ) = X˜mt(ρ)δ + µ˜m(ρ) + νmt. (5.2)
Now, the problem is transformed to a traditional fixed-effect problem with transformed
fixed-effect µ˜m(ρ).
˜˜dmt(θ, β, ρ)−
¯˜˜
dm·(θ, β, ρ) = (X˜mt(ρ)− ¯˜Xm·(ρ))δ + νmt − ν¯m·, (5.3)
d˙mt(θ, β, ρ) = X˙mt(ρ)δ + ν˙mt, (5.4)
where
¯˜˜
dm·,
¯˜Xm·, and ν¯ represent the average of corresponding variables across time t.
Now, given any (θ, β, ρ), we are be able to obtain an unbiased estimate of δ using
OLS estimator. The sum of squares, i.e.
∑
(1− θzmt)2νˆ2mt, can be calculated as follows,
1. For any given (θ, β, ρ), compute d˙mt, X˙mt.
2. Compute the OLS estimator of δ in Equation 5.4; denote as δˆ.
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3. Compute estimates of residuals in Equation 5.2, ˆ˜µm + νˆmt =
˜˜dmt(θ, β, ρ)− X˜mtδˆ.
4. Estimate transformed fixed effect ˆ˜µm using the average of estimated residuals ob-
tained in step 3. Calculate νˆmt subsequently.
5. Compute sum of squares(θ, β, ρ) =
∑
(1− θzmt)2νˆ2mt.
The nonlinear least square procedure is applied to find the optimal (θ, β, ρ) that min-
imizes sum of squares(θ, β, ρ). One additional comment about the initial observation,
since we take partial difference in the model, the degree of freedom decreases by one
within each group, i.e., market-departure-date. Simply omitting the first observation is
likely to cause inefficiency when the number of groups is small, i.e., 45 departure dates
in each market. We apply Prais-Winsten transformation to the first observation in each
group, i.e. multiply by the first error term by
√
1− ρ2.
Additional Table
152
Table 5.3: Prediction Models for Weak- and Strong-Form Rational Expectations: Market
L
Weak-Form Rational Exp. Strong-Form Rational Exp.
Probit Model Pr(Pt + 1 < pt) Supply Model
current to last -0.035 Pricet−1 0.924
(0.732) (0.033)
current to inital 10.818 cumulative demandt−1 0.046
(2.819) (0.059)
current to mktavg -8.257
(2.854)
weeklyfare cv -4.167
(1.756)
initial price 0.041 initial price 0.043
(0.013) (0.011)
t -0.580 t 6.186
(0.216) (0.055)
t2 0.127 t2 -1.382
(0.039) (0.946)
t3 -0.008 t3 0.076
(0.002) (0.045)
final week 31.463
(7.177)
high season -1.070 high season 10.699
(0.325) (5.450)
day-of-week dummies yes day-of-week dummies yes
const -12.190 const -3.255
(3.381) (16.176)
pseudo R-square 0.1729 R-square 0.8751
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